United States v. Smith Pitterson, 20-2994

Defendant Carlos Smith Pitterson was convicted after a jury trial of distribution and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and heroin and conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.
On the stand Pitterson testified he participated in drug transactions because he was threatened by a man called "Pepe." His counsel, however, expressly disclaimed a duress defense at trial.
The government objected when the defendant testified about threats; the district court instructed the jury that duress was not a claim but that threat testimony could be considered for entrapment and to provide the overall picture of events.
The court reiterated in its final charge that threats did not constitute a defense here, but could be considered insofar as they bore on entrapment and the defendant’s predisposition.
Pitterson appealed, arguing the instructions implied the threat evidence was irrelevant to mens rea, thereby reducing the prosecution’s burden and impeding his defense.
The Second Circuit reviewed the instructions (de novo where preserved) and affirmed, holding the court’s instructions were not erroneous and did not prevent consideration of legally permissible defenses.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether jury instructions improperly excluded duress and implied threat evidence was irrelevant to mens rea	Gov't: Court correctly told jury duress was not claimed and limited threat evidence to entrapment/overall context	Pitterson: Instructions suggested threats couldn’t negate mens rea or show lack of willfulness, lowering prosecution’s burden	Held: No error — duress was not pleaded and instructions allowed consideration of threats for entrapment and context; mens rea not negated by duress evidence
Whether threat testimony could negate the required intent/knowledge for narcotics convictions	Gov't: Knowledge/willfulness requirement is distinct from motive; threats do not negate mens rea	Pitterson: Threats could show he did not act knowingly/willfully	Held: Rejected — intent (mens rea) can coexist with motive to avoid harm; duress does not negate knowing/willful conduct required for narcotics offenses
Standard of review for the jury charge claim	Gov't: Where objections preserved, review is de novo; otherwise plain-error	Pitterson: Some objections preserved, others not; asks reversal in any event	Held: Court applied appropriate review (de novo for preserved objections) and found no reversible error

United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.) (describing de novo review for preserved jury-charge objections and harmless-error framework)
United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d 299 (2d Cir.) (plain-error standard for unpreserved jury-charge objections)
United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir.) (instruction must adequately state the law and not mislead the jury)
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (motive to avoid harm is consistent with intent to commit an act)
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (duress does not negate knowing or willful mens rea where statute requires such mental state)
United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231 (2d Cir.) (mens rea satisfied by knowledge of the prohibited act and the object — a controlled substance)