United States v. Smith, 811 F.3d 907

Terry Joe Smith, a Putnam County, Indiana police officer, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using excessive force against two persons (Cletis Warren and Jeffrey Land) while acting under color of state law.
At separate incidents, Smith punched Warren in the face (causing severe bleeding and swelling) and kneed Land in the torso after dropping him, causing fecal incontinence; Smith later bragged about the conduct.
At trial, several police officers who witnessed the assaults testified; defense counsel objected that portions of their testimony constituted expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and thus required qualification — the district court admitted the testimony under Rule 701.
The jury convicted Smith; the district court sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release (below the Sentencing Guidelines range of 33–41 months).
Smith appealed his conviction; the government cross-appealed the sentence as unreasonably light and argued the judge failed to adequately justify the large downward variance.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, also noting the judge erred by not orally stating the supervised-release conditions at sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of officer testimony (Rule 701 vs. Rule 702)	Government: officers’ lay-opinion and eyewitness testimony about the assaults and reasonableness of force was admissible under Rule 701.	Smith: portions were expert opinion requiring qualification under Rule 702.	Court: testimony was primarily eyewitness/lay-opinion and admissible under Rule 701; no reversal.
Admissions and inculpatory statements	Government: Smith’s bragging admissions were admissible and independently supported conviction.	Smith: contested relevance/weight.	Court: admissions were properly admissible as statements against interest.
Reasonableness of sentence (large downward variance)	Government: 14 months was unreasonably low; judge failed to provide cogent reasons for deviating sharply from Guidelines.	Smith: judge considered mitigating factors (community service, employment history, remorse) warranting variance.	Court: affirmed need for deference to individualized sentencing but vacated sentence because the judge did not adequately justify the large variance; remand for resentencing.
Oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions	Government: procedural error — conditions were not stated orally at sentencing.	Smith: (no meaningful defense)	Court: error; sentencing must include oral pronouncement of the full sentence and conditions.

United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2006) (officer lay-opinion on use of force not necessarily expert testimony)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts must provide reasons for significant variances from Guidelines)
United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2009) (sentencing comparison for excessive-force conviction of an officer)
United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2003) (sentencing for officer who kneed and punched suspect)
United States v. White, 68 Fed.Appx. 707 (7th Cir. 2003) (officer sentenced for striking a civilian causing lacerations and stitches)
United States v. Cozzi, 613 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2010) (officer used a sap against an arrestee; sentencing considered)
United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2009) (multiple officers convicted for severe, prolonged assaults; long sentences upheld)
United States v. Harper, 805 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (oral pronouncement requirement for supervised-release conditions)