373 F. Supp. 3d 223
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Officers Akhtar and Smith (MPD) approached a parked car with heavily tinted windows in a high-crime area; Defendant was standing at the open driver-side door with others nearby and two children in the back seat.
- Within ~30 seconds of exiting their vehicle and while within arm’s reach, Officer Akhtar grabbed Defendant, asked about PCP, and requested handcuffs; Defendant was calm and compliant.
- Officers testified they smelled a strong PCP odor in the vicinity but could not reliably localize it to Defendant; they also offered inconsistent testimony about observing a glass vial in the driver-side door.
- Defendant was handcuffed and, after consenting to a pat-down, Officer Smith felt a hard cylindrical object in Defendant’s crotch area; that object later proved to be the barrel of a loaded handgun; officers also found heroin and cash.
- Court credited that officers smelled PCP in the area but found the government failed to prove the odor emanated from Defendant or that officers actually saw a vial before handcuffing him.
- Court concluded handcuffing converted the Terry stop into an arrest without probable cause; consent to the pat-down was tainted by the unlawful seizure, so evidence recovered was suppressed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Defendant Smith) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonable suspicion to stop | Stop was not supported by articulable suspicion | Tinted windows in high-crime area justified investigatory stop | Stop was lawful (Terry stop upheld) |
| Use of handcuffs: whether elevated stop to arrest | Handcuffing 30 seconds into encounter converted stop into arrest without probable cause | Handcuffs reasonable for officer safety given PCP odor and risks associated with PCP | Handcuffing was unreasonable and transformed the stop into an arrest |
| Probable cause to arrest at time of handcuffing | No particularized evidence linking PCP odor or vial to Defendant | Odor of PCP, tinted windows, and alleged vial provided probable cause (or at least justified precautions) | No probable cause; odor alone (not localized to person) insufficient to arrest |
| Validity/scope of pat-down and consent | Consent given while handcuffed was coerced; pat-down exceeded Terry frisk | Defendant consented to pat-down; frisk was lawful and not a cavity search | Consent invalid due to temporal proximity to unlawful seizure; evidence from pat-down suppressed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (burden ordinarily on proponent of suppression motion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officers may conduct brief investigative stops on reasonable suspicion)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force reasonableness standard)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (stop must be no longer or more intrusive than necessary)
- Holmes v. United States, 505 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (consent given after unlawful seizure may be tainted; Brown factors apply)
- Butler v. United States, 102 A.3d 736 (D.C. 2014) (odor of drugs must be linked to a specific person to support probable-cause arrest)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree exclusionary principle)
- United States v. Glover, 681 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (odor of PCP can supply probable cause to search the location emitting the odor)