United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446

Background

Carl Smith was convicted in 2007 of two counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of powder cocaine; the PSR attributed 1.69 g crack and 3.36 g powder.
Smith was sentenced as a career offender to 210 months' imprisonment under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; he has served ~13 years of a 17.5-year term.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), but was not retroactive at enactment.
The First Step Act § 404 (2018) permits retroactive sentence reductions for a "covered offense" defined as a violation of a federal criminal statute whose "statutory penalties" were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
The district court denied Smith § 404 relief, concluding his conviction under § 841(b)(1)(C) was not a "covered offense;" the First Circuit reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Smith's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Smith's conviction is a "covered offense" under First Step Act § 404	§ 841 (or § 841(a)) is the statute of conviction and the statutory penalties in § 841(b)(1) were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, so Smith is covered	Smith was convicted under § 841(b)(1)(C); because (C)'s text and its prescribed punishments did not change, its statutory penalties were not "modified" and thus not covered	Reversed: the Court held Smith's offense is a covered offense because Fair Sentencing Act modified § 841(b)(1) thresholds, which in turn modified penalties applicable to § 841(a) violations, including (C) by incorporation
Whether the phrase "statutory penalties for which were modified" applies to the statute of conviction or the defendant's particular conduct	Applies to the statute of conviction (§ 841/§ 841(a)), not to the particular quantity attributed to the defendant	The government reads the phrase to require modification of the specific subsection tied to the defendant's proven quantity (treating subsections as distinct statutes)	Court agreed with Smith: phrase refers to the statute of conviction, not the individual conduct
Whether Alleyne means each § 841(b)(1) subsection is a separate "Federal criminal statute" for § 404 purposes	Alleyne is a criminal-procedure rule about elements/jury findings and does not change Congress's intent in § 404; statutory threshold changes modify penalties even if proved as elements	Alleyne shows quantity specifications are elements; therefore each subsection of § 841(b)(1) is a separate statute and (C) was not modified	Court rejected the Alleyne-based argument and held Alleyne does not prevent treating § 841(a)/§ 841 as the applicable statute modified by the Fair Sentencing Act
Appropriate remedy if offender is "covered": plenary resentencing vs. limited variance	Smith would benefit from plenary resentencing because Guidelines changes (e.g., burglary no longer a crime of violence) likely eliminate career-offender status and lower GSR	Government argued remedy scope was unsettled	Court held coverage only; remedial procedure (full resentencing or Godin/Ahrendt-style variance) left to district court on remand; reduction is discretionary

Key Cases Cited

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act not retroactive at enactment; explains sentencing context)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (drug-quantity thresholds can be elements requiring jury finding)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (principle that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be proved to jury)
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018) (statutory headings inform congressional intent)
United States v. Frates, 896 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2018) (discusses post-conviction procedures for sentence reduction; Godin/Ahrendt line)
United States v. Godin, 522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (establishes a procedure for limited post-conviction resentencing/variance)