United States v. Smith, 494 F.Supp.3d 772

Background

Reginald Smith was indicted on Dec. 5, 2019 for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense; he was detained pending trial.
Defense and court orders produced multiple excluded periods under the Speedy Trial Act (STA), and Smith filed motions to suppress that tolled the clock while pending and being decided.
COVID-19 restrictions in the Eastern District prompted continuances and motions by the Government for ends-of-justice exclusions under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7); the court excluded certain periods and could not retroactively exclude some dates.
As of the order, the court found the 70-day STA limit had not been exceeded after accounting for exclusions, but further delay was likely because jury trials could not safely be conducted in 2020.
The court made on-the-record, case-specific findings balancing STA factors (including public‑safety risk, Smith’s detention history, and COVID conditions) and, on its own motion, excluded time through June 7, 2021, set trial for June 7, 2021, and denied Smith’s motion to dismiss.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Smith)	Held
Whether the STA post-indictment 70‑day limit was violated	Excludable periods (defense requests, motions, court orders) mean 70 non‑excludable days have not passed	STA violated by post‑indictment delay and COVID‑related pauses; move to dismiss	Denied — statutory limit not yet exceeded after accounting for exclusions
Whether an ends-of-justice exclusion under §3161(h)(7) is proper for COVID‑related delay	COVID restrictions and inability to safely hold jury trials justify a case‑specific ends‑of‑justice continuance	Argues exclusions must be case‑specific and not indefinite; seeks dismissal rather than further exclusion	Granted on court’s own motion through June 7, 2021 — court made required findings and limited the exclusion in time
Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial right was violated	Delay attributable to COVID precautions in good faith; not government blameworthy	Delay (over a year until scheduled trial) is presumptively prejudicial and violates Sixth Amendment	Denied — Barker factors weigh against relief: delay presumptively prejudicial but justified by COVID; no showing of serious prejudice to defense
Whether pretrial detention violates the Fifth Amendment (due process)	Detention under Bail Reform Act and magistrate’s findings are lawful	Pretrial detention excessively prolonged and punitive in violation of due process	Denied — court finds detention not excessively prolonged and magistrate’s detention order reasonable; relief via Bail Reform Act motion for reconsideration if circumstances change

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (STA purpose and harms of delay)
United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (requires case‑specific, time‑limited ends‑of‑justice findings)
United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (ends‑of‑justice continuance cannot be indefinite)
United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1997) (STA specificity requirements for findings)
United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1994) (ends‑of‑justice provision not a general exclusion)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptively prejudicial delay threshold)
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (court must make proper §3161(h)(7) findings)
United States v. Myers, 930 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2019) (Barker balancing and attribution of delay)
United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1989) (calculating STA periods and exclusions)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention under Bail Reform Act)