460 F.Supp.3d 981
E.D. Cal.2020Background
- Smith was indicted on Dec. 5, 2019 for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense; he was arrested, arraigned Dec. 19, and detained by order of the magistrate on Dec. 23, 2019.
- The court held status conferences on Feb. 4 and Mar. 17, 2020 and previously excluded time by agreement; an April 14, 2020 status conference was continued to June 16, 2020 because of COVID-19 orders.
- The government moved to exclude time from April 14 through June 16, 2020 under the Speedy Trial Act (STA) "ends of justice" provision; Smith opposed, asserting Sixth Amendment and STA speedy-trial rights.
- The court held a hearing on the motion on May 19, 2020 and evaluated STA requirements for ends-of-justice continuances in the COVID-19 context.
- The court denied the government’s request to retroactively exclude April 19–30, 2020 under § 3161(h)(7), found May 1–the date of the order excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(D), and granted an ends-of-justice exclusion for May 20–June 16, 2020.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactive exclusion of Apr. 19–30, 2020 under § 3161(h)(7) (ends-of-justice) | COVID-related court closures and general orders justify an ends-of-justice exclusion for the requested period | Smith invoked Sixth Amendment and STA rights; gov't lacked case-specific factual showing | Denied — court may not make nunc pro tunc ends-of-justice findings; Apr. 19–30 not excluded |
| Excludability of May 1–date of order under the STA | Gov't sought to exclude this period to avoid dismissal as STA clock approached | Smith opposed; argued need for specific factual showing of prejudice/impediment | Granted — court held May 1–date excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(D) |
| Exclusion of May 20–June 16, 2020 under § 3161(h)(7) for a forward continuance | Gov't requested a six-week ends-of-justice continuance because in-person jury trials unsafe and continuance needed to avoid dismissal | Smith stressed speedy-trial interests, detention, and argued gov't did not earlier invoke specifics | Granted — court made specific, case-based findings (impossibility to safely hold jury trial, public-safety concerns, defendant’s violent history) and excluded May 20–June 16 |
| Whether general COVID-19 orders suffice for § 3161(h)(7) findings or case-specific findings are required | Many districts used generic COVID-based orders; gov't relied on general pandemic circumstances | Smith argued that ends-of-justice requires case-specific findings and concrete facts showing how COVID impeded preparation | Court held case-specific findings are required; generic pandemic orders alone are insufficient for retroactive exclusions, though a properly supported forward-looking continuance may be granted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing STA purpose and concerns underlying speedy-trial protections)
- United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (requires ends-of-justice findings referenced to facts as of the time the delay is ordered)
- United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (prevents courts from making nunc pro tunc ends-of-justice findings)
- Zedner v. United States, 546 U.S. 489 (2006) (confirms judge must make required STA findings on the record)
- United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1997) (stresses STA specificity requirements and that ends-of-justice cannot be used to circumvent statutory time limits)