880 F.3d 392
7th Cir.2018Background
- In 2015 Henshaw was arrested at a DEA-arranged cocaine purchase; agents found large cash, 750g marijuana, and ecstasy at his home; he admitted being a marijuana dealer and owing $30,000 for 30 pounds of marijuana.
- Henshaw pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana; PSR designated him a career offender based on two prior felony drug convictions.
- PSR calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 151–188 months; without career-offender status his range would have been 57–71 months.
- Government recommended 151 months; Henshaw’s counsel sought 57 months; the district court sentenced Henshaw to five years’ probation with special conditions—a 151-month downward variance from the Guidelines low end.
- The district court cited the offense circumstances, perceived harshness of the career-offender guideline for nonviolent drug predicates, and Henshaw’s personal/family background and employment as reasons for probation.
- Government objected and appealed, arguing the probationary sentence was substantively unreasonable for failing to account for deterrence, punishment, and disparity concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 151-month downward variance to probation was substantively reasonable | Government: the probationary sentence is substantively unreasonable because it fails to provide specific and general deterrence, just punishment, and avoids unwarranted disparities | Henshaw: district court properly weighed §3553(a) factors (offense circumstances, career-offender harshness, family/employment) and probation was appropriate | Court: Vacated and remanded—variance was substantively unreasonable for inadequate consideration of deterrence, desert, and disparities |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by imposing a non-incarceratory sentence despite noting probation had failed previously | Government: prior failures on probation show probation will not deter Henshaw; incarceration needed | Henshaw: court can give opportunity to rehabilitate; probation may preserve employment/family support | Court: Abuse of discretion—court acknowledged probation’s ineffectiveness yet imposed it, creating an irreconcilable discrepancy |
| Whether policy disagreement with career-offender guideline can justify a large variance | Government: disagreement alone insufficient to justify so large a downward variance without stronger reasons | Henshaw: court may vary based on categorical policy disagreement with career-offender application to nonviolent drug offenders | Court: District court may disagree with Guidelines, but must understand Commission’s aims and provide proportional, cogent reasons; here reasons weren’t sufficient for the magnitude of the variance |
| Whether sentencing court adequately addressed §3553(a)(6) disparities | Government: probation creates unwarranted disparities versus similarly situated defendants | Henshaw: individualized factors justify leniency | Court: Probation created significant disparity compared to similar defendants and was not justified here |
Key Cases Cited
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standards for reviewing variances and need for stronger justification for major departures)
- United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2007) (sentences of no or nominal imprisonment require careful weighing of deterrence and desert)
- United States v. Brown, 610 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2010) (vacating large downward variance where words and sentence were irreconcilable)
- United States v. McIlrath, 512 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2008) (no rigid formula but proportionality between justification and extent of deviation)
- United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (vacating significant variance when sentencing explanation and result conflict)
- United States v. Smith, 811 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2016) (importance of cogent reasons when departing from Guidelines)
- United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (district court may categorically disagree with Commission and vary on policy grounds)
- United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court discretion to vary based on policy disagreement)
- United States v. Molton, 743 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014) (role of general deterrence in sentencing)
