United States v. Sineneng-Smith
140 S. Ct. 1575
| SCOTUS | 2020Background
- Evelyn Sineneng‑Smith ran an immigration consulting business in San Jose and charged clients (largely Filipino caregivers) fees to file labor‑certification and adjustment applications. Many clients were ineligible for the dispensation she relied on because they missed a statutory filing deadline. She collected over $3.3 million.
- Indicted on multiple counts, including three counts under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (encouraging/inducing aliens to reside unlawfully) with enhanced penalties for private financial gain; convicted on two §1324 counts and other counts she does not contest here.
- In district court Sineneng‑Smith argued the statute did not reach her conduct, raised vagueness and First Amendment defenses directed to her own conduct, and preserved those arguments through trial and initial appeal briefing.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit sua sponte invited three amici to brief whether §1324 is facially overbroad under the First Amendment (an issue the parties had not pressed), gave amici expanded argument time, and ultimately held the statute facially overbroad.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion by departing from the party‑presentation principle—vacating the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanding for consideration confined to the case as presented by the parties.
Issues
| Issue | Sineneng‑Smith (Plaintiff) | Government (Defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv): does advising/filing labor‑certification applications for aliens already in U.S. qualify as "encourage" or "induce" to reside unlawfully? | Argues her conduct (filing lawful applications) did not "encourage" or "induce" unlawful residence. | Argues statute covers conduct that induces/resolves unlawful residence—and here prosecution rested on false promises and fees. | Supreme Court did not resolve the statutory merits; remanded for appellate decision keyed to parties' arguments. |
| First Amendment overbreadth of §1324 | Raised First Amendment defenses aimed at her own conduct (vagueness, content‑based speech restrictions). | Solicitor General urged a limiting construction: statute should be read to reach only speech integral to criminal conduct, not protected expression. | Supreme Court held the Ninth Circuit erred in injecting a facial overbreadth challenge it had not been asked to decide; did not adjudicate overbreadth on the merits; vacated and remanded. |
| Appellate procedure / party presentation: Was the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to amici and reframing of the appeal appropriate? | Relied on the arguments she had preserved; was not the source of the overbreadth theory the panel adopted. | N/A (Government defended statute and urged limiting construction). | Court held the panel abused its discretion by departing drastically from party presentation, improperly soliciting amici to reshape the appeal. |
| Remedy / disposition: What relief is appropriate when an appellate panel reaches an issue not presented by the parties? | Sought review of her convictions and arguments as presented below. | Petitioned this Court to review circuit’s invalidation of federal statute. | Court vacated Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded for reconsideration consistent with the issues the parties actually presented. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (explaining party‑presentation principle; courts are neutral arbiters of issues presented by parties)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (warning that First Amendment overbreadth is "strong medicine" and should not be casually employed)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (describing overbreadth rationale and cautioning against premature facial invalidation)
- Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (origin of modern overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (describing standards and cautions for facial challenges)
- United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1987) (characterizing courts as passive instruments that decide questions presented by the parties)