United States v. Simpson-El
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8636
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Kapelle Simpson-El was convicted for selling stolen cars and ordered to pay $432,930 in restitution.
- After release, he paid at least 5% of his gross monthly income toward restitution.
- While incarcerated he sued the federal government under the FTCA for inadequate medical care; after release he settled for $200,000.
- The government moved to modify the restitution order under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), asking that Simpson-El apply the settlement to restitution.
- The district court found the settlement was a "material change in economic circumstances" and applied $145,640 of the $200,000 to restitution.
- Simpson-El appealed, arguing (1) the settlement could not constitute a material change because it compensated future income loss and (2) the court improperly relied on § 3664(n). The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Simpson-El) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a post‑sentencing personal‑injury settlement is a "material change in economic circumstances" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) | Settlement merely compensates future lost income (so no new ability to pay now) | A cash settlement, even if partly for future income loss or non‑economic damage, creates immediate access to funds and can materially change ability to pay | Yes — the settlement constituted a material change that could affect restitution ability; district court did not err |
| Whether the district court failed to compare pre‑ and post‑sentencing circumstances as required | Court did not adequately compare circumstances before and after sentencing | Court considered alleged future income loss and present income/employment and identified a new fund not previously accessible | No — explanation was adequate; comparison implicit in court's discussion |
| Whether the district court improperly relied on § 3664(n) (which applies to prisoners' settlements) | § 3664(n) does not apply because Simpson‑El received funds after release; reliance would be error | The district court referenced § 3664(n) only for contrast and expressly rejected its application | No — court did not rely on § 3664(n) and correctly declined to apply it |
| Standard of review for § 3664(k) determinations | De novo review (argued by Simpson‑El) | Government argued abuse of discretion; court assumed de novo for argument but would affirm under either standard | Outcome affirmed under either standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Hull ex rel. Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992) (distinguishes economic losses from noneconomic hedonic damages)
- United States v. Grant, 235 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (access to previously unavailable funds can be a material change under § 3664(k))
- United States v. Grant, 715 F.3d 552 (4th Cir. 2013) (district court must assess whether post‑sentencing receipts constitute a material change before modifying restitution)
- United States v. Grigsby, [citation="579 F. App'x 680"] (10th Cir. 2014) (defines "material change" as a bona fide change affecting ability to pay restitution)
- United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (district court explanations for restitution schedules must show consideration of appropriate factors)