United States v. Shusta Traverse Gumbs, 964 F.3d 1340

Background

Gumbs, a fugitive, was located in a one‑exit parking lot where U.S. Marshals task‑force officers blocked his car and approached with guns drawn and vests identifying them as law enforcement.
Officers reached into Gumbs’s running car; Gumbs accelerated, pinning and injuring Inspector Lempka and narrowly missing three other officers before fleeing and later abandoning the car.
Gumbs was indicted on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b): count 1 (striking Inspector Lempka) and count 2 (forcibly resisting/interfering with other officers near the car).
At trial Gumbs sought jury instructions defining “forcibly” and “use” of a deadly weapon, and an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault; the district court largely denied these requests and gave its own instructions.
The jury convicted Gumbs on both counts (count two limited to the three officers closest to the car); he was sentenced to 235 months. Gumbs appealed, challenging the refused instructions, the court’s supplemental answer to a jury question, and the sufficiency of the evidence on count two.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Refusal to define “forcibly”	"Forcibly" means intentional use or threatened use of physical force and that must be instructed	Statutory language and court’s instruction ("intentional display of force") already covered it	No abuse of discretion; instruction tracking §111 sufficient
2) Deadly‑weapon instruction detail	Jury should be told a car is a weapon only if defendant used it as a weapon and "use" requires active employment/intent to use as weapon	Court’s definition that a vehicle is a deadly weapon if used in a way capable of causing death, plus general‑intent law, suffices	No abuse; §111 is general intent and court’s instruction adequate
3) Lesser included offense (simple assault)	Jury should be allowed to convict of §111(a) simple assault as lesser included offense	The only alleged assault was use of the car, so any §111(a) finding would also satisfy §111(b) — no distinct lesser offense evidence	Denied; lesser included instruction not warranted on these facts
4) Supplemental answer to jury (is a car a deadly weapon if you don’t intend it?)	Court should answer “no” or reiterate knowing‑and‑willful mens rea requirement	Reading the prior deadly‑weapon instructions was appropriate; §111 requires general intent to use the object, not specific intent to weaponize it	No error; supplemental instruction rerouting jury to earlier charge was correct
5) Sufficiency of evidence for count two / denial of judgment of acquittal	Insufficient proof he directed force at officers or used car as weapon against them	Officers were inches from car reaching in when Gumbs floored the gas, injured Lempka, and used car to resist arrest; vehicle capable of serious injury	Evidence sufficient; conviction on count two affirmed

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Carrasco, 381 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir.) (standard for reviewing refusal of requested jury instruction)
United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir.) (requirements for requested jury instructions)
United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 515 (11th Cir.) (statute‑tracking instructions pose little danger of prejudice)
United States v. Hightower, 512 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.) (language of §111, including “forcibly,” needs no elaboration)
United States v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir.) ("forcibly" requires some amount of force)
United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir.) (§111 is a general‑intent statute)
United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir.) (defendant need only intend to use the object that constitutes the deadly weapon)
United States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir.) (standards for supplemental jury instructions)
United States v. Gonzalez, 122 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir.) (similar facts held sufficient for §111(b) conviction)
United States v. Gualdado, 794 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir.) (automobile can be a deadly weapon when used to run down an officer)