United States v. Shults
1:17-cr-00136
E.D. Cal.Nov 16, 2018Background
- Defendant Craig Shults is indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) for retaliatory threats against Judge Andrew Guilford stemming from events while Shults was in custody.
- Government sought to admit testimony from two confidential witnesses: CW2 (stipulated by defendant, rendering that motion moot) and CW3 (identified as P.V.), who will testify Shults repeatedly offered to pay him $100,000 to arrange Judge Guilford’s murder while both were at FCI Lompoc.
- P.V. reported the proposition to prison officials; he previously (in 2008) solicited murder of a confidential informant and pleaded guilty to related charges.
- Defendant seeks to impeach P.V. with evidence about a separate inmate murder plot (the Walthall case) that targeted Judge Guilford, including media coverage and cooperating-witness incentives.
- Parties dispute relevance and admissibility of P.V.’s testimony (intrinsic evidence v. Rule 404(b)), scope of impeachment on Walthall, and how much to say about the sentence imposed by Judge Guilford and facts of the underlying fraud case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of CW2 testimony | Gov: CW2 will testify Shults threatened Judge Guilford in Jan 2014 at Santa Ana Jail | Shults stipulated to CW2 testimony conditioned on no Govt objection to testimony from investigating Marshal (moot) | Denied as moot (stipulation resolved objection) |
| Admission of CW3 / P.V. testimony | Gov: P.V.’s statements at Lompoc are intrinsic or admissible under Rule 404(b) to show intent, motive, and to tell coherent story about true threats | Shults: Events at Lompoc are separate in time/place and different scheme; testimony is not probative of intent for charged offense and is prejudicial under Rule 403 | Granted: testimony is inextricably intertwined; alternatively admissible under Rule 404(b); probative value outweighs prejudice |
| Impeachment re: Walthall case (P.V.’s bias/knowledge) | Gov: Limit scope; many Walthall details irrelevant and prejudicial; avoid sideshow | Shults: May show P.V.’s bias/self-interest via media/knowledge and inmate discussion at Lompoc | Granted in part: defense may impeach with evidence of publicly available media, general prison awareness, and circumstantial evidence P.V. knew; court will limit granular/detailed side-show evidence and scope governed by P.V.’s testimony |
| Evidence about sentence and underlying fraud case | Gov: May say sentencing occurred; seeks to characterize sentence specifics | Shults: Limit detail about sentencing and underlying offense; avoid prejudicial detail | Court: Government may say Judge Guilford imposed substantially more time than defense sought but may not mention the 90‑month figure; underlying fraud case details limited to very general description; opening the door may change scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) (motions in limine permit pretrial exclusion of prejudicial evidence)
- Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1997) (motions in limine help manage trial proceedings)
- Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial exclusion avoids prejudicial evidence and jury taint)
- United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (other-act evidence may be admitted when inextricably intertwined or necessary to give a coherent story)
- United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1993) (single criminal episode doctrine limits application of Rule 404(b))
- United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (404(b) permits admission of subsequent acts to show state of mind)