908 F.3d 1219
10th Cir.2018Background
- Morning of March 11, 2015: Defendant Walt Shrum called 911 after his common-law wife was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead; police "secured" the home and denied Shrum access.
- Investigator Cooke escorted Shrum to the sheriff’s office, interviewed him for ~2 hours, and told Shrum the coroner needed the deceased’s medication for an autopsy.
- At ~9:30 a.m. Shrum signed a written consent limited to retrieving medication; Cooke entered (10–15 minutes), retrieved meds and dogs, photographed rooms, and observed ammunition in an open bedroom closet.
- Later that day Cooke learned Shrum was a convicted felon, contacted ATF, and a magistrate issued a search warrant at 10:00 p.m.; the nighttime warrant execution uncovered ammunition, two loaded firearms, paraphernalia, and suspected methamphetamine.
- Shrum was charged federally; he moved to suppress. The district court denied suppression, finding the initial securing reasonable and consent valid; the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the initial seizure unconstitutional and that subsequent consent/search/warrant were tainted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Shrum) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the police "securing" the home at ~6:19–7:02 a.m. was a Fourth Amendment seizure and if lawful | Securing a scene outside a home after an unexpected death is reasonable and did not amount to a constitutionally significant seizure | The police seized the home by denying Shrum access without warrant, probable cause, or exigency | The court: It was a Fourth Amendment seizure and unreasonable at its inception (no probable cause or exigent circumstances) |
| Whether evidence Cooke observed during the consent entry (ammunition) and the later warrant were admissible despite the initial seizure | The consent and later warrant were lawful; any delay in obtaining a warrant does not validate the initial securing | Consent was tainted by the illegal seizure; evidence seen under that consent was fruit of the poisonous tree, invalidating the warrant | The court: Consent was the product of exploitation of the illegal seizure; the observation and resulting warrant were tainted and inadmissible |
| Whether any exception (independent source, inevitable discovery, or attenuation) validated the warrant and its fruits | Government: later probable cause and warrant issuance purge the taint; coordination time explains delay | Shrum: no independent source or inevitable discovery; consent and evidence flowed directly from illegal seizure | The court: No independent source or inevitable discovery shown; attenuation factors do not purge taint; suppression required |
| Whether suppression is required to deter similar police conduct | Government: suppression not warranted because evidence would have been discovered and officers acted to obtain a warrant | Shrum: exclusion is necessary to deter unlawful home seizures and protect sanctity of the home | The court: Exclusion warranted — officer conduct was unlawful and objectively culpable; deterrence supports suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (independent-source doctrine can allow admission despite an earlier unlawful entry)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (fruit of the poisonous tree / but-for causation and attenuation principles)
- Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (police may temporarily prevent reentry when supported by probable cause and a diligent warrant effort)
- Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (no "crime-scene" exception to warrant requirement)
- Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (warrantless searches after a homicide require exigent circumstances; efficiency alone insufficient)
- Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (evidence discovered after an unlawful entry cannot be used to establish probable cause; independent-source rule)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (attenuation factors: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, purpose/ flagrancy of official misconduct)
- Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (attenuation framework reiterated — temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and flagrancy; note: S. Ct. citation used per opinion discussion)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (standards for voluntariness of consent)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (exclusionary rule’s deterrence focus; suppression requires officer culpability or systemic negligence)
(Additional authorities cited in the opinion inform reasoning but the above are the controlling precedents relied upon.)