United States v. Shawn Morgan
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18758
8th Cir.2013Background
- At 12:45 a.m., Omaha officers observed a car parked far from a 24‑hour grocery with tinted windows; occupants appeared to be "ducked down."
- As officers approached, driver Shawn Morgan made furtive movements under his seat and initially refused a command to show his hands; officers drew weapons, removed and handcuffed all three occupants.
- Concerned a weapon might be under the driver’s seat, Officer Normandin immediately searched under the seat, felt a lockbox large enough to hide a gun, and removed it.
- Normandin asked "What is this?" before giving Miranda warnings; Morgan replied there was meth in the box and that he was a dealer (pre‑Miranda statement).
- After Miranda warnings, Normandin opened the lockbox, found meth, a white powder that field‑tested positive for cocaine, and $1,780; Morgan made additional incriminating post‑warning statements.
- The district court suppressed the physical evidence and postwarning statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest; the government appealed and the Eighth Circuit reversed in part and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Morgan's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and conduct a protective vehicle search under Terry/Long | Detention/search exceeded Terry scope; arrest was unlawful, so evidence must be suppressed | Furtive movements, late hour, remote parking, and recent robberies gave reasonable suspicion and justified protective sweep | Officers had reasonable suspicion; protective search under Long was lawful |
| Whether removal from vehicle and handcuffing converted the stop into an arrest | Handcuffing and detention were arrests lengthening the stop beyond Terry | Removing and handcuffing were reasonable safety measures during a Terry stop and not unduly prolonged | Handcuffing and immediate search were reasonable and did not make the stop an unlawful arrest |
| Whether physical evidence seized after a pre‑Miranda admission must be suppressed as fruit of Miranda violation | Physical items found after unfollowed Miranda should be suppressed as fruits of unlawful arrest/violation | Miranda violation does not require suppression of physical evidence; Patane controls | Physical evidence (drugs, cash) admissible under Patane despite pre‑Miranda statement |
| Whether postwarning statements are admissible after an initial unwarned admission | Postwarning statements tainted by initial Miranda violation and should be suppressed | No deliberate two‑step tactic; subsequent Miranda waiver was voluntary and knowing per Elstad/Berghuis | Postwarning statements admissible (pre‑warning admission remains suppressed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation warnings requirement)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonable‑suspicion investigatory stops)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (protective vehicle searches based on officer safety)
- Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (limits on vehicle searches incident to arrest; recognizes Long)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (postwarning statements admissible if subsequent waiver voluntary)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (invalidates deliberate two‑step interrogation designed to circumvent Miranda)
- United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (Miranda violation does not mandate suppression of physical evidence)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruits of unlawful police conduct doctrine)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from understanding and subsequent statements)