United States v. Shakespeare, 32 F.4th 1228

In 2018 Shakespeare pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, was sentenced to prison and ten years of supervised release with SORNA registration and no contact with minors.
While on supervised release he sexually assaulted a 14‑year‑old, pleaded guilty in tribal court, then pleaded guilty in federal court in 2020 to abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2243(a)(5); his federal plea admitted the conduct and included a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding range.
Probation petitioned to revoke his 2018 supervised release, alleging a § 3583(k) trigger (registering under SORNA and committing a listed sex offense), which mandates a minimum five‑year revocation sentence.
The district court held a combined sentencing (2020 conviction) and revocation hearing; Shakespeare admitted the supervised‑release violation after being advised of rights, the court took judicial notice of his guilty plea, sentenced him to 293 months on the 2020 conviction and imposed a consecutive 5‑year mandatory revocation term under § 3583(k).
On appeal (first raised there), Shakespeare argued § 3583(k)’s application violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment jury‑trial rights (relying on Justice Breyer’s Haymond concurrence) and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; the Tenth Circuit reviewed for plain error and affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying § 3583(k) violated jury‑trial rights (Apprendi/Alleyne/Haymond)	§ 3583(k) functions as a separate substantive crime requiring indictment and jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt	Shakespeare admitted the triggering facts in a guilty plea; Apprendi/Alleyne do not apply to admitted facts or prior convictions (Almendarez‑Torres)	Rejected — no plain error; plea admissions and prior‑conviction principle defeat Apprendi claim
Whether imposition of § 3583(k) revocation term implicates double jeopardy	Mandatory revocation sentence is an additional punishment that triggers double jeopardy concerns	Revocation proceedings and post‑revocation sanctions are part of punishment for the original offense, not a new prosecution (Johnson)	Rejected — double jeopardy claim fails under Johnson
Whether Justice Breyer’s Haymond concurrence controls and renders § 3583(k) unconstitutional as applied	Breyer’s concurrence should be read broadly to require full jury protections for § 3583(k) revocations	Breyer’s concurrence is an as‑applied opinion hinging on three conjunctive factors; here one factor is absent (judicial factfinding under preponderance), so concurrence does not apply; Marks analysis does not compel reversal	Rejected — concurrence in Haymond does not apply to these facts and, even if read broadly, no clear/obvious error shown under plain‑error review

Haymond v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (Supreme Court splintered decision addressing § 3583(k); plurality, dissent, and Breyer concurrence produced different rationales and a remand on remedy)
Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (prior‑conviction exception: facts of a prior conviction need not be submitted to a jury under Apprendi)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (extends Apprendi to facts that increase mandatory minimums)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (revocation sanctions are part of the punishment for the original offense, not a new prosecution for double jeopardy purposes)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (rule for identifying the holding of fractured Supreme Court decisions)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error standard for unpreserved claims)
Salazar v. United States, 987 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2021) (Marks/ Haymond analysis in the revocation context)