16 F.4th 1091
4th Cir.2021Background:
- U.S.-based "romance" fraud stole victims' funds which were deposited into "drop" accounts; proceeds were distributed through a transnational laundering network coordinated in part by a Maryland resident, Gbenga Ogundele.
- Seun Banjo Ojedokun lived and worked in Lagos, Nigeria during the conspiracy; he sent/forwarded emails with deposit/wire documents through two email accounts and later moved to the U.S.
- FBI agents visited Ojedokun at his Chicago home on April 25, 2019; he allowed them inside, was interviewed, consented to a phone search, then was arrested; material from the interview and phone was used at trial.
- Original indictment (May 6, 2019) charged §1956(h) conspiracy and identified the predicate as "conspiracy to commit wire fraud" (a non-qualifying specified unlawful activity); Superseding indictment (Aug. 10, 2020) amended predicate to wire fraud (§1343) and narrowed the date range.
- District court denied suppression and statute-of-limitations challenges, rejected Ojedokun’s later extraterritoriality argument, convicted him of conspiracy to commit money laundering (§1956(h)), and sentenced him to 108 months; appeal followed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1956(f) provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over a §1956(h) conspiracy | §1956(f) explicitly creates extraterritorial jurisdiction and applies to conduct prohibited by §1956, including conspiracies | §1956(f) does not reach §1956(h) conspiracies because conspiracy is only a "mere agreement" (not "conduct") and need not involve a "transaction"; his conduct occurred wholly in Nigeria | §1956(f) rebuts presumption against extraterritoriality and applies to §1956(h); Ojedokun’s conspiracy also occurred "in part" in the U.S. (agreement with a Maryland resident and substantial U.S. overt acts) |
| Whether the Aug. 2020 Superseding Indictment was time-barred or could relate back to May 2019 Original Indictment | Superseding relates back because the Original supplied sufficient factual notice of the same money‑laundering conspiracy despite a defective citation to the predicate offense | Changing the cited "specified unlawful activity" from conspiracy to substantive wire fraud materially broadened/amended the charge, making the superseding untimely under the 5-year statute | Superseding indictment related back; the factual allegations were essentially unchanged, so the change in predicate citation and narrowed timeline did not materially broaden or prejudice Ojedokun |
| Whether FBI entry into Ojedokun’s home violated the Fourth Amendment (plain‑error review) | Consent to enter and interview was voluntary and its scope was not exceeded | Consent was involuntary or too limited; evidence was therefore fruit of poisonous tree | No plain error: record supports voluntary consent and no scope exceedance; admission of statements/phone evidence stands |
| Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the entry-based suppression claim on the merits | Not shown on the record; counsel could reasonably decline a meritless suppression theory | Counsel ineffectively failed to move to suppress entry-based evidence | Claim not addressed on the merits on direct appeal because ineffectiveness does not "conclusively appear" from the record; must be raised in collateral §2255 unless record conclusively shows it |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) (a §1956(h) conspiracy can be completed by agreement alone; an overt act is not required)
- RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (two-step framework for extraterritoriality: (1) clear congressional intent; (2) focus/domestic-application inquiry)
- Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes absent clear contrary intent)
- Smith v. United States, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995) (indictment need not plead detailed circumstances of the specified unlawful activity when citation or facts give notice)
- Bolden, United States v., 325 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (§1956(h) does not require an overt act; factual allegations can suffice to identify specified unlawful activity)
- Shabani v. United States, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) (the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus for conspiracy)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless, nonconsensual home entry to effect a routine felony arrest violates Fourth Amendment)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent is a totality-of-circumstances factual inquiry)