United States v. Seth Windham, 53 F.4th 1006

In March 2021 a grand jury charged Seth Windham with one count of federal kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)) — the indictment referenced use of a cellular phone and motor vehicle and alleged Windham and accomplices kidnapped M.S., held him at gunpoint, and demanded money.
Windham initially pleaded not guilty but in May 2021 entered a negotiated guilty plea to the single count; his written plea agreement listed elements of §1201(a)(1) and §2 (aiding and abetting) and contained a factual stipulation admitting the kidnapping, demands for money, use of a phone and car, and holding M.S. at gunpoint.
At the change-of-plea colloquy Windham confirmed he read, initialed, and signed the plea agreement, that he reviewed it with counsel, and he pleaded guilty after the court recited the charge.
The district court accepted the plea and later sentenced Windham to 120 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal Windham argued (1) no factual basis supported his guilty plea — specifically that the record did not show the phone or car were used in interstate commerce — and (2) his plea was not knowing/voluntary because he misunderstood the nature of the charge (claiming he pleaded only to aiding and abetting).
The Sixth Circuit reviewed for plain error (no contemporaneous Rule 11 challenge) and affirmed the conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't)	Defendant's Argument (Windham)	Held
Sufficiency of factual basis for federal kidnapping (§1201): whether intrastate use of car/phone satisfies the statute's interstate-commerce element	Gov't: Plea admissions (demanded money, held at gunpoint, used phone & car) provide factual basis; cars and phones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce	Windham: Record lacks proof phone/car were used in interstate commerce; therefore §1201(a)(1) not satisfied	Held: Affirmed — admissions supply factual basis; intrastate use of cars/phones qualifies as "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" under §1201(a)(1) per Sixth Circuit precedent and reasoning consistent with Protho.
Knowing and voluntary plea / nature of charge (aiding & abetting vs kidnapping)	Gov't: Plea colloquy and written plea show Windham understood single count of kidnapping; aiding-and-abetting language described mode of liability, not a separate substantive charge	Windham: He was misinformed and thought he pleaded only to aiding and abetting, not kidnapping	Held: Affirmed — court complied with Rule 11; Windham acknowledged the charge and signed the plea; no plain error.

United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021) (interprets “otherwise” and scope of §1201 and explains reach of statute when interstate channels or instrumentalities are used)
United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999) (telephones and similar items are instrumentalities of interstate commerce even when used intrastate; distinction between phrasing "in" vs "of" interstate commerce)
United States v. Protho, 41 F.4th 812 (7th Cir. 2022) (holds class-character of automobiles/phones as instrumentalities suffices without proof of a particular vehicle’s interstate use)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power; framework for categories of regulable activity)
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause cannot reach noneconomic violent criminal conduct based solely on aggregate effects)
United States v. Pitts, 997 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2021) (Rule 11 standards for factual basis and plea colloquy review)
United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2010) (plain-error review where defendant fails to contemporaneously challenge guilty plea)
Vonn v. United States, 535 U.S. 55 (2002) (Rule 11: failure to object at plea hearing subjects appellate review to plain-error standard)