United States v. Sergio Rodriguez
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10669
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Rodriguez was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 39A for aiming a laser pointer at Air-1, a helicopter, and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of five years.
- He was also convicted of attempting to interfere with the safe operation of an aircraft under 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) and (a)(8), receiving a fourteen-year sentence for reckless disregard.
- Evidence showed Rodriguez intentionally targeted the cockpit with a high-power laser; Coleman admitted sharing the laser and shining it skyward.
- The district court grouped the two convictions for sentencing, applying an intentional endangerment enhancement to § 32 conviction, and ordered concurrent sentencing for § 39A.
- On appeal, Rodriguez challenged the sufficiency of evidence for willful interference and reckless disregard, and argued remand for resentencing on § 39A.
- After Gardenhire (9th Cir. 2015) clarified recklessness must be proved with awareness of risk, the panel reversed the § 32(a)(5), (a)(8) conviction and remanded for acquittal and resentencing on § 39A.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supports willful interference under § 32(a)(5), (a)(8). | Rodriguez argues no evidence shows willful interference with operation or awareness of risk. | Government asserts intentional targeting plus knowledge of danger implies interference and recklessness. | Insufficient evidence; acquittal on § 32(a)(5), (a)(8) is required. |
| Whether Gardenhire controls whether recklessness was proven. | Gardenhire shows no clear awareness of risk from laser beaming at aircraft. | Gardenhire is distinguishable but applies to recklessness under § 2A5.2 and informs mens rea. | Gardenhire controls; absence of awareness of risk precludes recklessness finding. |
| Whether remand is necessary for acquittal and resentencing on § 39A. | Sentence based on § 32 conviction should stand if § 39A is valid. | Remand required because § 39A sentencing depended on the § 32 conviction and Gardenhire undermines the basis. | Remand for acquittal on § 32 and for resentencing on § 39A; §32 conviction reversed. |
| Whether the § 39A conviction stands independent of § 32 conviction’s impact on sentencing. | § 39A conviction remains appropriate; § 32 should not contaminate it. | Sentencing based on § 32 inflates § 39A sentence; should be reassessed. | § 39A conviction remanded for sentencing independent of § 32 terms. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gardenhire, 784 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (recklessness requires awareness of risk; cannot infer from intentional act alone)
- United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of attempt require substantial step toward completion)
- United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (recklessness requires awareness of risk)
- United States v. Albers, 226 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2000) (reckless disregard requires awareness of risk and gross deviation from standard)
- Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (willfulness requires awareness of illegality)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (recklessness standard involves awareness of risk)
- Odom, 329 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard for sufficiency review by reasonable doubt)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1980) (standard for sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases)