United States v. Seraphina Charley
1 F.4th 637
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- On March 6, 2018, Seraphina Charley struck her boyfriend Merle Begay in the head with a piece of rebar; Begay suffered serious brain and other injuries and did not testify at trial.
- Charley initially told 911 and FBI agents a false story (and gave a false name and birthdate) that a masked man attacked Begay; she later admitted the lie and claimed she acted in self-defense because Begay attacked her while intoxicated.
- At trial Charley testified to prior instances in which Begay allegedly attacked her; several witnesses corroborated at least one of those episodes.
- In rebuttal the Government called Charley’s stepmother and sister to testify about two earlier incidents (unrelated to Begay) in which Charley, while intoxicated, allegedly assaulted them; the district court admitted this evidence over Charley’s Rule 404 objection and gave a limiting instruction.
- A jury convicted Charley on three counts: two assault counts (18 U.S.C. § 113) and one false-statement count (18 U.S.C. § 1001). On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the false-statement conviction, vacated the two assault convictions, and remanded for a new trial on the assault counts and resentencing on the false-statement count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Charley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for false-statement (Count 3) | Evidence (lies to 911/FBI, prior lies, recorded phone call, prior warnings that lying to agents is a crime) permits a rational juror to infer willful knowledge that the statements were false and unlawful. | Charley admitted lying but argued the Government failed to prove she knew lying to federal agents was unlawful (willfulness). | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence allowed jurors to infer knowledge/willfulness; conviction upheld. |
| Admissibility of prior family-incidents as character evidence under Rules 404(a)/405 | Government contended it could rebut Charley’s self-defense testimony by showing her violent tendencies (character) and thus offered specific prior acts. | Charley argued Rule 404 forbids admission of specific prior-act evidence to prove propensity; only reputation/opinion evidence (or limited 405 exceptions) would be permissible. | Reversed: specific prior acts unrelated to Begay were improper character evidence; Rule 405 exceptions did not apply. |
| Admissibility under Rule 404(b) (other-acts for motive/intent/identity) | Government claimed prior incidents showed motive/intent and who the initial aggressor was. | Charley argued the incidents were too dissimilar, remote, and only probative of propensity, not a propensity-free purpose. | Reversed: Government failed to show a non-propensity, probative chain linking the prior incidents to motive or intent for the charged assault; evidence improperly used to show propensity. |
| Harmless error and remedy | Government argued any error was harmless given overall case; urged affirmance of convictions. | Charley argued admission of rebuttal other-acts evidence was highly prejudicial, warranting a new trial on assault counts. | Reversed and remanded: admission was not harmless (rebuttal evidence dominated closing argument and likely affected jury); new trial for assault counts ordered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (character evidence can improperly lead jury to punish for who defendant is, not what defendant did)
- United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1995) (victim-character evidence in self-defense cases ordinarily limited to reputation or opinion; specific instances disfavored)
- United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980) (prior assaults generally weak as proof of transferred intent over time)
- United States v. Berckmann, 971 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (other-acts may illuminate defendant’s mindset and relationship to victim; admissibility requires narrow, non-propensity purpose)
- United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009) (vacating conviction where prior batteries only showed violent propensity and were used to rebut self-defense)
- United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1989) (prior-bad-act evidence admissible for motive only when it establishes a motive material to the offense, not mere propensity)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 880 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2018) (requiring a propensity-free chain of reasoning for admission of other-acts evidence)
- United States v. Carpenter, 923 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2019) (standards for admitting Rule 404(b) evidence and reviewing such admission)