United States v. Seng Yong
926 F.3d 582
9th Cir.2019Background
- In 2014 during the World Cup, FBI and Nevada agents investigated an alleged illegal sports-betting operation run from three Caesars Palace villas; searches followed after agents (and an IT contractor) deliberately disrupted hotel DSL to gain entry and observed betting-related activity.
- Agents obtained a warrant supported by an affidavit that omitted and misstated material facts about the orchestrated DSL disruptions; searches produced ledgers and laptops, including one logged in as "WaiKin" with a large account balance.
- Eight defendants—including Seng Chen Yong and his son Wai Kin—were indicted on gambling and Wire Act felonies; Yong later entered a group plea to a misdemeanor accessory-after-the-fact charge in exchange for the Government dismissing charges against Wai Kin.
- Before Yong’s plea, defense counsel had filed motions (including a Franks challenge) and received discovery revealing the Government’s intentional DSL disruptions; the district court later found the Government engaged in Franks violations and suppressed evidence as to one defendant.
- Yong moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing (1) the plea was involuntary because it was conditioned on leniency for his son when the Government lacked probable cause to prosecute the son, and (2) pervasive government misconduct coerced the plea; the district court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Yong's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of plea conditioned on leniency for third party (Wai Kin) | Plea involuntary because Govt lacked probable cause to prosecute Wai Kin when Yong pleaded, so using charges as bargaining leverage was improper | Plea valid because Govt had probable cause to prosecute Wai Kin at time of Yong’s plea | A plea tied to leniency for a third party is involuntary only if the Govt lacked probable cause to prosecute that third party at the time of the plea; here probable cause existed, so plea stands |
| Effect of Government misconduct on voluntariness | Misconduct (fabrications/omissions in warrant affidavit and orchestrated entries) so pervasive that Yong’s plea was coerced | Although misconduct occurred, Yong knew of it before pleading and still chose to plead, so plea was voluntary | Because Yong was aware of the misconduct when he pled, the misconduct did not render his plea involuntary |
| Timing standard for third-party probable cause | Probable cause must exist when defendant pleads (not just when threat first made) | Same—Govt argues probable cause existed at plea time | Court holds probable cause must be assessed at time of the plea; probable cause existed here |
| Procedural-default on §2255 claims | Yong contends cause and prejudice excused failure to raise claims on direct appeal (fear of vindictiveness toward son; deception impaired appellate challenge) | Govt argues claims are procedurally defaulted | Court declined to resolve procedural-default because claims were meritless on the merits; denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (warrant affidavit material misstatements/omissions may require suppression)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent; involuntary pleas induced by misrepresentation are void)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (constitutional requirement that pleas be voluntary)
- Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320 (2014) (probable cause is not a high bar; indictment generally establishes probable cause)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecution’s failure to uncover evidence can be materially exculpatory under Brady)
- United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecutors using threats to third parties must act in good faith; absent probable cause, such tactics may constitute fraud)
- United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1993) (plea bargaining that benefits third parties requires careful voluntariness review)
- United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2013) (post-plea revelation of police fabrications in affidavit can render plea involuntary when defendant was unaware at plea time)
- Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (challenges to conviction based on pre-plea constitutional deprivations are limited when defendant pleaded guilty)
- Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (pleas induced by promises/threats that deprive voluntariness are void)