United States v. Senecca Freeman
679 F. App'x 450
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Freeman sold heroin mixed with fentanyl; a customer’s girlfriend fatally overdosed and police uncovered Freeman’s operation.
- Freeman was indicted on five counts (guns and drugs); the Government offered a plea: plead guilty to one firearms charge and concede ACCA career-offender status (15-year minimum) in exchange for dismissal of other counts.
- Freeman accepted the plea; the agreement allowed litigation at sentencing over any departure from the Guidelines.
- The Government sought an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (death resulting from defendant’s conduct); the district court found Freeman knew the product was highly dangerous and granted the departure.
- Freeman was sentenced to over 22 years. He appealed claiming (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel misadvised that a prior Michigan unarmed-robbery conviction qualified as an ACCA violent felony) and (2) the upward departure was improper.
- The Sixth Circuit declined to resolve the IAC claim on direct appeal and held Freeman waived his sentencing challenges under his broad plea waiver; the judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Freeman's Argument | Government/Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Freeman may raise ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) on direct appeal for counsel’s advice that a prior Michigan unarmed-robbery conviction qualified as an ACCA violent felony | Counsel misadvised Freeman about ACCA exposure, violating the Sixth Amendment | IAC claims generally are ill-suited to resolution on direct appeal because the record usually lacks facts about counsel’s strategy; this one is premature | Denied on procedural grounds — court declined to decide IAC on direct appeal because record insufficient |
| Whether the district court erred in granting an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 for death resulting from the defendant’s conduct | The court improperly considered "relevant conduct," failed to make required mens rea findings, and used a preponderance standard to establish dismissed/uncharged conduct | Freeman waived these sentencing challenges in his broad plea agreement, which allowed consideration of dismissed/uncharged conduct for departures | Waived — appellate waiver enforced; merits not reached |
| Whether Freeman’s burden-of-proof challenge fits an exception to the appellate waiver ("unconstitutional factor") | The use of preponderance to find uncharged conduct is an unconstitutional factor and thus outside the waiver | The "unconstitutional factor" exception refers to protected-class factors (e.g., race, religion); Freeman’s claim does not fit and is an attempt to reframe sentencing-process arguments as constitutional | Rejected — the exception does not cover Freeman’s claims |
| Whether ambiguity in the waiver should be construed against the Government to permit appeal | The phrase "such as" makes the unconstitutional-factor exception open-ended and ambiguous, favoring Freeman | Contra proferentem applies only where two reasonable interpretations exist; the waiver’s language plainly targets protected-class factors | Rejected — waiver enforced according to its plain terms |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (IAC claims generally not suitable for direct appeal; record often inadequate)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel’s duty where statute is clear; deficient advice when consequence is succinct and explicit)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (narrowing what qualifies as an ACCA violent felony)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (erroneous strategic predictions do not necessarily constitute deficient performance)
- United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. precedent declining to hear IAC claims on direct appeal)
- United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374 (enforce appellate waivers according to their terms)