United States v. Scott Harry, 930 F.3d 1000

On Feb 10, 2017 a confidential informant (CI) texted a drug-task-force investigator that Harry had left to “pick up” drugs, would be driving a newer white single‑cab pickup registered to Dennis Thul’s father, and would return around noon; later the CI said Harry was about an hour away.
Officers located and stopped a truck matching the CI’s description for speeding; Harry was the driver and Thul the passenger. The stop occurred around 12:50–12:58 p.m.
A K‑9 was deployed within seconds of a deputy’s request; the dog alerted within about 23 seconds. About five minutes after the stop, officers found ~1.5 pounds of methamphetamine in the truck bed.
Harry was Mirandized, initially denied knowledge, then admitted ownership and said he was paid to transport the drugs; he later changed his theory and sought to blame Thul at trial.
Pretrial, Harry moved to suppress the search and to exclude government 404(b) evidence; he also sought to admit prior‑acts evidence against Thul. The district court denied suppression, excluded some but admitted other prior‑acts evidence. Harry was convicted and sentenced to 280 months.

Issue	Harry's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether dog sniff and search unlawfully extended traffic stop (Rodriguez)	The dog sniff impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop beyond its mission	The sniff occurred concurrently with routine traffic processing (two officers working) and did not extend the stop	Affirmed: sniff did not unlawfully extend stop; search lawful
Whether CI provided reasonable suspicion for drug search	CI reliability was not established; tip insufficient to support a search	CI gave specific, predictive details (vehicle, occupants, timing) establishing reliability and reasonable suspicion	Affirmed: CI tip provided reasonable suspicion independent of speeding
Admissibility of government witnesses testifying about Harry’s prior drug sales (404(b))	Such testimony is impermissible propensity evidence	Harry put intent/knowledge at issue (mere‑presence defense), so prior‑acts evidence is admissible to prove intent/knowledge; district court vetted and limited evidence	Affirmed: admission appropriate and, in any event, any error was harmless given admissions and other evidence
Admissibility of Thul’s prior convictions (reverse 404(b))	These convictions are relevant to shift blame to Thul; incarceration period does not make them remote	District court found 14–17 year‑old convictions too remote under reasonableness standard	Affirmed: exclusion not an abuse of discretion due to remoteness

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (traffic stop cannot be prolonged beyond mission absent reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (dog sniff lawful where stop and sniff occurred simultaneously)
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (predictive information from informant can establish reliability)
United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2013) (informant reliability may be shown by predictive details)
United States v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2015) (standards for admitting prior bad acts under Rule 404(b))
United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318 (8th Cir. 1995) (prior bad acts admissible when defendant places mental state at issue)
United States v. Eggleston, 165 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1999) (harmless‑error standard where improper propensity evidence admitted)
United States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2014) (reverse 404(b) framework and abuse‑of‑discretion review)
United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2011) (remoteness analysis for prior acts; ~13 years often outer limit)