United States v. Scott Carnell
972 F.3d 932
7th Cir.2020Background
- Scott Carnell pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50+ grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine; the PSR attributed 2.37 kg of "ice" and recommended an offense level leading to a 192‑month sentence.
- Carnell objected only to the PSR’s classification of the drugs as "ice" (defined by U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, note C as d‑methamphetamine HCl of at least 80% purity), arguing the term was used colloquially.
- The government offered three categories of evidence: (1) nomenclature — defendants and co‑defendants repeatedly called the product "ice"; (2) physical/user descriptions — testimony that it was crystalline and "high quality"; and (3) two DEA lab reports (from separate seizures not clearly tied to this conspiracy) showing ~100% purity.
- The district court accepted the PSR’s classification and found by a preponderance that Carnell distributed "ice." Carnell appealed the purity classification.
- The Seventh Circuit held that the government must prove by a preponderance that the substance attributed to the defendant meets the Guidelines’ 80% purity threshold, and that testimony/nomenclature/visual descriptions alone cannot satisfy that burden without reliable scientific linkage. The court reversed the purity finding and remanded; it affirmed admission of lab reports at sentencing despite the analysts not testifying.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carnell) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the government proved methamphetamine was "ice" (>=80% purity) by a preponderance at sentencing | Vernacular, user/dealer testimony, and physical descriptions are insufficient to prove >=80% purity | Dealer/user testimony, law‑enforcement observation, nomenclature, and DEA lab reports from related seizures suffice | Government must prove >=80% purity by a preponderance; dealer/user testimony and nomenclature alone are insufficient; district court abused discretion in finding sufficiency here |
| Whether lab reports whose authors did not testify were inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause or due process | Admission denied Carnell the right to confront analysts and impaired his ability to challenge reliability | Sentencing proceedings are not subject to the Confrontation Clause; courts may consider out‑of‑court statements at sentencing | Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing; district court did not err admitting lab reports under sentencing discretion |
| Whether DEA purity results from other seizures could be attributed to Carnell’s conspiracy | The government failed to show a reliable link tying those tested samples to Carnell’s attributable quantity | Co‑conspirator testimony and overlapping contacts established a sufficient connection | The linkage was too attenuated here; pure samples from separate seizures were insufficient to attribute 2.37 kg of >=80% meth to Carnell without stronger proof |
Key Cases Cited
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (textual‑analysis canon: give effect to each clause and word)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless inconsistent with statute or Constitution)
- United States v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1998) (sentencing may use circumstantial/expert evidence where testing cannot distinguish isomers)
- United States v. Cones, 195 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1999) (Congress/Commission deliberately accounted for purity in methamphetamine sentencing)
- United States v. Stephenson, 557 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2009) (experts, users, and dealers treated as informative when chemical distinction is infeasible)
- United States v. Walker, 688 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2012) (contrasting view that circumstantial/user evidence may suffice to prove "ice")
- United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2013) (Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing)
- Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various information in imposing sentence)