United States v. Scott Cammorto
859 F.3d 311
4th Cir.2017Background
- In 1999 Cammorto pleaded guilty in Georgia to rape and kidnapping; he registered as a sex offender after release but later moved without notifying authorities. He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for knowingly failing to register and pleaded guilty.
- The probation office recommended Tier III classification under the Guidelines based on the Georgia rape conviction, which would raise the Guidelines range to 33–41 months (base offense level 16); Cammorto sought Tier I treatment (base level 12, 24–30 months).
- Cammorto argued his Georgia rape conviction could rest on aiding-and-abetting liability (he did not personally have intercourse) and thus did not categorically match the federal aggravated sexual abuse offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2241.
- The district court applied the categorical approach, found the Georgia rape statute to be a categorical match with federal aggravated sexual abuse (aiding-and-abetting treated as principal liability), and sentenced Cammorto to 41 months.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding Georgia rape is no broader than § 2241 aggravated sexual abuse and that Georgia aiding/encouraging liability does not create a realistic probability of liability outside the federal offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cammorto’s Georgia rape conviction categorically qualifies as a predicate "comparable to or more severe than" federal aggravated sexual abuse (Tier III) | Georgia rape can be convicted by an aider/abettor who never touches the victim, so the state offense is broader than § 2241 | Federal law treats aiders/abetters as principals too; compare elements under the categorical approach and Georgia rape is narrower or equivalent | Court held Georgia rape categorically matches § 2241; Tier III classification affirmed |
| Whether Georgia’s parties-to-a-crime provision (includes "encourages") makes state liability broader than federal § 2 aiding-and-abetting | Inclusion of "encourages" shows broader scope of liability than federal § 2, so the state statute sweeps more conduct | Supreme Court and federal law define aiding/abetting to encompass encouragement; Georgia case law does not show a realistic probability of broader application | Court held federal aiding/abetting includes encouragement and Georgia law does not realistically sweep beyond federal law; argument rejected |
| Preservation and proof requirement for showing a realistic probability that Georgia law sweeps more broadly | (Raised at oral argument) Georgia law is broader; should invalidate categorical match | Defendant notes lack of state precedent showing such broader application and Duenas-Alvarez requires concrete examples | Court found the argument unpersuasive and insufficiently preserved; no realistic probability shown |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.) (categorical-approach principles applied to sex-offense tiering)
- United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700 (4th Cir.) (discusses realistic-probability standard for categorical approach)
- United States v. Johnson, 492 F.3d 254 (4th Cir.) (defines force/threat concepts in federal sexual-offense context)
- United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747 (6th Cir.) (force includes threats sufficient to coerce submission)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (state aider/abettor liability does not defeat categorical match absent realistic probability of broader application)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (generic-offense analysis underpinning categorical approach)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (federal aiding-and-abetting liability encompasses encouragement)