United States v. Scott, 979 F.3d 986

At Downstate Correctional Facility, correction officers Kathy Scott and George Santiago, Jr. joined other officers in a multi-minute beating of inmate Kevin Moore, who suffered severe facial fractures, broken ribs, and a collapsed lung.
Evidence showed Scott used supervisory authority during the assault (ordering probationary officers removed; directing restraints) and Santiago participated physically (grabbing, kicking, punching); other officers testified for the government.
After the assault, officers fabricated a story and falsified use-of-force and injury reports (including staged photos and altered reports) to portray Moore as the aggressor; Scott directed other officers not to prepare reports or speak about the incident.
Defendants were tried in the Southern District of New York, convicted on counts including conspiracy to deprive civil rights (18 U.S.C. § 241) and falsification of records (18 U.S.C. § 1519), and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
On appeal, Defendants challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence of a § 241 conspiracy, (2) the district court’s § 1519 jury instruction regarding a nexus to federal investigations, and (3) the constitutionality (vagueness) of § 1519.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy under § 241	Gov’t: evidence (coordinated restraint, supervisory orders, joined beating, cover-up) supports tacit agreement to deprive Moore of rights	Scott/Santiago: assault was spontaneous; no time or proof of an agreement	Court: Affirmed; jury could infer a tacit agreement from concerted actions and supervisory facilitation
Jury instruction on § 1519 nexus to federal investigation	Gov’t: § 1519 requires intent to impede an investigation or matter within federal jurisdiction but not knowledge of a specific impending federal probe	Defendants: Marinello requires a nexus to a particular federal proceeding reasonably foreseeable	Court: No plain error; Marinello does not overrule controlling circuit precedent (Gray); §1519 has no nexus requirement to a specific federal proceeding
Vagueness of § 1519	Gov’t: statute, read with scienter, gives fair warning and prevents arbitrary enforcement	Scott: wording ("in relation to or contemplation of any such matter") could criminalize conduct without intent to impede a future investigation, making it vague	Court: Rejected vagueness challenge; adopts reading that §1519 requires knowing intent to impede an investigation, which cures notice/arbitrariness concerns

United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding §1519 has no nexus-to-a-specific-proceeding requirement)
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) (interpreting nexus requirement in tax obstruction statute)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (obstruction statute construed to require connection to due administration of justice)
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (narrow construction of obstruction statute to avoid vagueness/overbreadth)
United States v. Beech–Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1989) ("gist of conspiracy is agreement")
United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) (tacit understanding can establish conspiracy)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (void-for-vagueness standards)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (void-for-vagueness framework and limits)
United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2012) (scienter in §1519 alleviates vagueness concerns)
United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2012) (reading §1519 to require intent to impede to avoid constitutional problems)