United States v. Schneider (Linda)
665 F. App'x 668
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Stephen (DO) and Linda Schneider (LPN) ran Schneider Medical Clinic, a high-volume pain clinic that prescribed large quantities of Schedule II–IV controlled substances and used physician assistants with pre-signed prescription pads.
- Clinic records showed minimal medical care, escalating dosages, red flags for addiction, and many patient overdoses; 68 clinic patients died of overdoses (2002–2008) and 100+ hospitalized for overdoses.
- In 2010 the Schneiders were convicted on multiple counts including unlawful dispensing and health-care fraud "resulting in" death or serious bodily injury; this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- After direct appeal, Burrage v. United States clarified § 841(b)(1)(C) requires but‑for causation for a "resulting in death" enhancement, prompting the Schneiders’ § 2255 motions challenging their resulting‑in convictions for failure to instruct on but‑for causation.
- The district court vacated most "resulting in death/serious bodily injury" convictions under Burrage but upheld one count (distribution of fentanyl to Robin G.) as harmless error; on reconsideration the court reinstated lesser‑included offense (LIO) convictions for the vacated counts and resentenced.
- Defendants obtained a COA on (1) whether the Count 4 Burrage error was harmless given conflicting expert testimony, and (2) whether substituting LIO convictions on collateral review violated Double Jeopardy; they appealed adverse rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the failure to give a Burrage (but‑for causation) instruction for Robin G. harmless on collateral review? | Gov: Under Brecht the record shows fentanyl was the but‑for cause (medical examiner & toxicologist testimony), so error was harmless. | Schneiders: Causation was contested; defense expert disputed fentanyl as operative cause, so error not harmless. | Affirmed: Under Brecht the government met its burden; expert testimony showed fentanyl was the but‑for cause beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| May the district court substitute convictions on lesser‑included offenses after vacating "resulting in" convictions on collateral review without violating Double Jeopardy? | Gov: Substituting LIO convictions is proper where vacatur affects only the greater offense; does not constitute a new prosecution. | Schneiders: Vacatur was an acquittal; reinstating LIOs is double jeopardy and another bite at the apple. | Affirmed: Double Jeopardy not violated; courts may correct vacatur by entering judgment on LIOs supported by the jury verdict. |
| Standard for harmless error on collateral review: Neder vs. Brecht | N/A: Court should apply Brecht on collateral review. | N/A: Defendants invoked Neder; argued omitted element was contested and not overwhelming. | Held: Brecht governs collateral review harmless‑error analysis; government must show error did not have substantial and injurious effect. |
| Whether a novel cumulative‑error claim (repetition of same error across counts) may be considered | N/A | Schneiders raised cumulative‑error claim on appeal (not raised below). | Not considered: claim not raised in §2255, COA motion, or COA order. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (but‑for causation required for § 841(b)(1)(C) "resulting in death" enhancement)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless‑error standard on collateral review: substantial and injurious effect)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (harmless‑error standards for omitted jury instructions on elements)
- Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005) (vacatur of guilty verdict is reviewable by government; double jeopardy does not bar correction of legal error)
- United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (policy rationale distinguishing postverdict legal rulings from acquittals for double jeopardy purposes)
- Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (approval of entering judgment for lesser included offense when greater offense reversed on grounds affecting only greater offense)
- United States v. Dago, 441 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Brecht standard in § 2255/habeas collateral review)
- United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 1996) (district court may reinstate LIO conviction on collateral review without violating double jeopardy)