United States v. Sarah Calvetti
836 F.3d 654
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Trooper Ziecina stopped a minivan driven by Sarah Calvetti for unsafe lane change and observed Calvetti and passenger Demás Cortez acting nervously; a 15-minute on-scene inquiry followed.
- Officers learned the van was not registered to Calvetti; Calvetti said she was responsible for its contents and consented to a search of the van.
- A drug-sniffing dog gave equivocal interest; a subsequent inspection revealed a hidden floor trap containing 16 kg of cocaine; both defendants were arrested.
- At DEA interview, Cortez waived Miranda and admitted involvement; Calvetti signed a Miranda form refusing to talk but was nonetheless questioned and later signed written consent to search her home.
- Search of Calvetti’s residence disclosed drug-packaging materials; both were indicted, convicted by jury, and appealed motions to suppress and related claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Calvetti’s consent to search her residence is protected by the Fifth Amendment | Calvetti: signing consent after invoking Miranda is testimonial/self-incriminating and tainted by interrogation | Government: consent is non‑testimonial and outside Fifth Amendment protection | Consent is not testimonial; Fifth Amendment does not bar admission of physical evidence found under consent |
| Whether agents violated Miranda by questioning Calvetti after she indicated she would not answer | Calvetti: she clearly invoked right to remain silent and questioning thereafter was impermissible | Government: questioning occurred but prosecution did not use her statements in its case-in-chief | Court: Miranda violation occurred but no Fifth Amendment injury because prosecution did not use compelled statements at trial |
| Whether consent to search Calvetti’s home was involuntary | Calvetti: exhaustion and lack of explicit notice of right to refuse rendered consent involuntary | Government: form stated consent was free; no coercion shown | Court: procedural forfeiture; on merits no plain error—consent voluntary under totality of circumstances |
| Whether prolonging the traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff/search was supported by reasonable suspicion | Defendants: officers unreasonably extended the stop without sufficient suspicion | Government: cumulative factors (driving, little luggage, inconsistent ownership, long travel, nervousness, criminal histories) created reasonable suspicion | Court: totality of circumstances provided reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and justify expanded inquiry |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy and possession with intent convictions | Calvetti: insufficient proof she knew of drugs or joined conspiracy | Government: recorded patrol-car conversation, call to co‑conspirator, deletion of number, and packaging materials tie her to conspiracy | Court: circumstantial evidence permissible; jury could find beyond reasonable doubt of participation and knowledge |
| Sentencing credit for acceptance of responsibility (Cortez) | Cortez: admitted ownership and testified, warranting two-level reduction | Government: his trial testimony and post-arrest conduct undercut genuine acceptance | Court: plain-error review; no relief—no clear acceptance warranting reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warning and right to cut off questioning)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation of right to remain silent must be unambiguous)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (distinguishing testimonial from physical evidence; voluntariness doctrine)
- Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (Fifth Amendment protects testimonial or communicative evidence)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness of consent)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (traffic-stop scope and impermissible prolongation without reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012) (reasonable-suspicion analysis in prolonged stop context)
- United States v. Cooney, 26 Fed.Appx. 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (consent to search is non‑testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes)
- Arizona v. Johnson / United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (officers may draw on experience; reasonable-suspicion is totality-of-circumstances)