United States v. Santonio Parker, 762 F.3d 801

Background

Santonio Parker was originally sentenced to 100 months for cocaine-base offenses; the district court declined to treat him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on Eighth Circuit precedent (King).
Parker’s 2005 convictions included a four-year sentence for resisting arrest (alleged qualifying violent offense) and a consecutive seven-year sentence for a non-qualifying offense; the two sentences were imposed the same day and aggregated under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2).
After Dorsey extended Fair Sentencing Act relief, Parker obtained resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; at resentencing the government revived its claim that Parker qualified as a career offender.
The district court again declined to apply the career-offender enhancement, calculated an advisory Guideline range of 37–46 months, but varied upward after weighing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and sentenced Parker to 84 months.
Both sides appealed: the government argued the career-offender enhancement should have applied; Parker argued the upward variance/departure and resulting 84-month sentence were procedurally or substantively unreasonable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Parker)	Held
Whether Parker’s aggregated same-day sentences produce two "prior felony convictions" for career-offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c)	The qualifying resisting-arrest conviction contributed to the criminal-history calculation and thus counts as a separate predicate; no ambiguity.	Aggregation means the companion qualifying conviction did not "receive" separate points under § 4A1.1(a)-(c), so it does not count as a separate prior felony for § 4B1.2(c).	The court adopts Parker’s reading: ambiguity exists and under the rule of lenity the Guidelines ambiguity is resolved in the defendant’s favor—Parker is not a career offender.
Applicability of law-of-the-case doctrine to bar relitigation of career-offender status at resentencing	Government implies prior sentencing ruling should bind resentencing.	Parker says resentencing after vacatur is plenary and prior ruling is not binding.	Court: law-of-the-case does not apply because resentencing after vacatur under § 2255 is de novo.
Whether the rule of lenity requires favoring Parker on ambiguous Guidelines language	Government: policy and textual arguments favor counting the qualifying conviction.	Parker: ambiguous text and structure require strict construction for defendant’s benefit.	Court: rule of lenity applies because two plausible readings exist; adopt defendant-favoring interpretation.
Procedural and substantive reasonableness of 84-month sentence (upward variance and departure)	Government ultimately concedes the sentence is appropriate based on record; sought longer only if career-offender applied.	Parker contends district court failed to explain departure/variance adequately and ignored his post-sentencing rehabilitation.	Court: district court gave adequate explanation, considered § 3553(a) factors, and the 84-month sentence is procedurally sound and substantively reasonable.

Key Cases Cited

King v. United States, 595 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2010) (interpreting ambiguity in § 4B1.2(c) and construing Guidelines in defendant’s favor)
United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (contrasting view that § 4B1.2 requires counting companion convictions as predicates)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse-of-discretion standard and procedural requirements for sentencing review)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines advisory, not mandatory)
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (application of Fair Sentencing Act to post-Act sentencings)
Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (rule of lenity and limits on judicial punishment beyond clear statutory prescription)
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (principles supporting lenity and strict construction in criminal contexts)