United States v. Sandra Thompson
690 F. App'x 244
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Thompson and co-defendant Brown were indicted for a multi-count scheme involving Medicare/DME fraud and illegal remuneration (conspiracy, health care fraud, and AKS-related counts).
- Allegation: Brown’s DME company, Psalms 23, billed Medicare for equipment beneficiaries did not need or did not receive; Thompson was alleged to have participated.
- Thompson previously was convicted in a separate Middle District of Louisiana prosecution (the Lobdale matter) for related DME/Medicare fraud involving a different DME provider (Lobdale).
- Thompson moved to dismiss the new indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the new charges duplicate the offenses of which she was already convicted.
- The district court denied the motion after applying the five-factor Marable test to determine whether the charged conspiracies were the same or distinct.
- The court certified the denial as appealable under Abney; the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo (factual findings reviewed for clear error).
Issues
| Issue | Thompson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether double jeopardy bars prosecution because the new indictment charges the same offenses as prior Lobdale convictions | The Psalms 23 indictment duplicates offenses of the Lobdale prosecution; prosecuting both violates Double Jeopardy | The two indictments involve distinct conspiracies and victims/providers; charges are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes | Denied — prosecutions are for separate conspiracies; double jeopardy does not bar the new indictment |
| Whether the conspiracy counts in both indictments constitute a single conspiracy under Marable factors | Single conspiracy spanning both cases because of similar conduct and overlap in substantive offense types | Conspiracies are distinct based on differences in time, personnel, overt acts, and locations; DME providers are central organizers in each scheme | Denied — after applying Marable’s five factors, the court found two separate conspiracies |
| Whether the district court misapplied Jones by treating DME providers as always the central organizing figures | Jones does not automatically make DME providers the central figures in every case; court erred if it applied Jones that broadly | Even if Jones was not meant as a universal rule, the court did not clearly err here: DME providers were central organizers in both cases | Denied — no clear error; DME providers were properly found to be central organizing figures in both conspiracies |
| Whether the district court’s factual findings warrant de novo reversal | Thompson contends facts show overlap amounting to same offense | Government contends factual differences support separate prosecutions | Denied — appellate court accepts district factual findings absent clear error and found none |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 733 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2013) (discusses factors relevant to assessing single vs. multiple conspiracies in health-care/DME fraud contexts)
- United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978) (articulates five-factor test to determine whether separate indictments allege a single conspiracy)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980) (overruling on other grounds noted in Marable context)
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (permits interlocutory appeal where denial of a double jeopardy claim presents a substantial question)