575 F.Supp.3d 16
D.D.C.2021Background
- On Jan. 6, 2021, a joint session of Congress convened to certify the Electoral College results; a violent mob breached the Capitol and the session was suspended.
- Ronald Sandlin and Nathaniel DeGrave traveled to D.C. with paramilitary gear and weapons, livestreamed statements urging violence, and encouraged taking the Capitol.
- The indictment alleges they forced past barricades, assaulted Capitol Police, pushed into the Senate Gallery and Chamber, and urged theft of laptops and paperwork.
- A Superseding Indictment charged both with, among other counts, obstruction of an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (Count Two) and aiding and abetting under § 2.
- Sandlin moved to dismiss Count Two arguing § 1512(c)(2) is limited to acts affecting evidence and that the Electoral Count was not an "official proceeding"; DeGrave argued "corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague; the Court treated the indictment allegations as true for the motion.
- The Court denied the motion, finding the Joint Session was an "official proceeding," § 1512(c)(2) reaches non‑evidence‑focused obstructive acts, and "corruptly" is not void for vagueness as applied here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Sandlin/DeGrave) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Jan. 6 Joint Session is an "official proceeding" under § 1515(a)(1)(B) | The Joint Session is a formal, constitutionally and statutorily prescribed hearing with a presiding officer, tellers, rules for objections, and a required decision (certification). | The Session was ceremonial/ministerial and not a court‑like proceeding that takes evidence or secures testimony; thus not an "official proceeding." | The Court held the Joint Session is an "official proceeding." |
| Whether § 1512(c)(2) is limited to obstructive acts that affect evidence/documents | § 1512(c)(2) is broad and, as the "otherwise" clause indicates, criminalizes other means of obstructing official proceedings beyond document tampering. | § 1512(c)(2) should be read narrowly in light of surrounding provisions to cover only acts related to records/evidence. | The Court held § 1512(c)(2) is not limited to evidence‑related acts and can include conduct that stops or hinders a proceeding. |
| Whether the term "corruptly" in § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague | "Corruptly" includes intent to obstruct and a wrongful/illegal element (e.g., independently criminal or inherently malign means); judicial gloss supplies adequate notice. | "Corruptly" is vague (Poindexter) and fails to give fair notice; may permit arbitrary enforcement. | The Court held "corruptly" is not void for vagueness here; alleged violent, unlawful means fall within the statute's core. |
| Whether vagueness/enforcement/lenity arguments require dismissal | The statute, as construed, gives fair warning; prosecution discretion and charging patterns are not grounds to dismiss; no grievous ambiguity for lenity. | Broad reading invites arbitrary enforcement; lenity should apply if ambiguity exists. | The Court rejected these arguments and found no grievous ambiguity warranting lenity or dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (U.S. 1974) (indictment sufficiency standard)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1997) (statutory interpretation begins with text)
- United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) (narrow definition of "proceeding" for agency contexts)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1995) (nexus requirement for obstruction‑type statutes)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (U.S. 2005) (limits on applying "corruptly" to lawful persuasion)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2015) (ejusdem generis/noscitur a sociis applied to limit a statutory term)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (U.S. 2014) (separate clauses can bear independent meanings)
- United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2014) (§1512(c)(2) operates as a catch‑all)
- United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2015) (§1512(c)(2) covers non‑evidence obstruction)
- United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (void‑for‑vagueness concerns about "corruptly" in §1505)
- United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1997) (standard for vagueness/notice)