United States v. Samuel Rosse III, 16-6321

Background

In 2012 Rosse was arrested after a controlled buy; authorities seized ~600–700 grams of 99.2% pure meth, cash, firearms, and evidence of a meth operation. He was indicted federally for meth possession with intent to distribute.
The first indictment was delayed repeatedly (continuances, competency evaluation); Rosse moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court found a violation but dismissed the indictment without prejudice.
The government filed a new complaint and then a superseding indictment charging larger quantities and conspiracy; Rosse moved to dismiss alleging vindictive prosecution and Fifth Amendment pre‑indictment delay. The motions were denied.
Rosse later pled guilty to the superseding indictment but reserved the right to appeal several rulings. At sentencing the Culbreath siblings testified against him. After appeal the judgment was vacated and the case remanded to address alleged Brady/Giglio nondisclosures concerning those witnesses.
On remand the district court held evidentiary hearings, found no Brady/Giglio violation, denied Rosse’s motions to dismiss and to withdraw his plea, and re‑imposed the original 324‑month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the first indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act	Rosse: 107‑day nonexcludable delay; prejudice and government misconduct (competency exam) justify dismissal with prejudice	Gov: technical Speedy Trial Act violation but dismissal without prejudice appropriate given offense seriousness, lack of prejudice, and no prosecutorial misconduct	Affirmed: dismissal without prejudice proper—offense serious, no bad faith, no actual prejudice; district court findings not clearly erroneous
Whether superseding indictment was vindictive or pre‑indictment delay violated the Fifth Amendment	Rosse: superseding indictment was retaliation for asserting Speedy Trial and bond rights; pre‑indictment delay caused prejudice	Gov: no realistic likelihood of vindictiveness; filing new indictment/appeal of bond decision not a punitive ‘‘stake’’; no showing of actual prejudice from delay	Affirmed: no presumption or proof of vindictiveness; no Fifth Amendment pre‑indictment delay shown
Whether second indictment violated district Speedy Trial Plan, Rule 48, Speedy Trial Act, or Sixth Amendment	Rosse: district plan breach, unnecessary delay, seventy‑day clock violation, and constitutional speedy‑trial violation (22 months)	Gov: most time was excludable due to Rosse’s motions/continuances; new indictment restarts clock; no unnecessary or unconstitutional delay	Affirmed: plan not enforceable right; nearly all time excludable; no Rule 48 unnecessary delay; Barker factors do not show Sixth Amendment violation
Whether government violated Brady/Giglio, whether Rosse could withdraw plea, and whether remand required new sentencing hearing	Rosse: government failed to disclose impeachment/leniency evidence re: Jeff and Paula Culbreath; nondisclosures were material and/or government suborned perjury; thus plea withdrawal or new sentencing required	Gov: disclosed cooperators’ status; incremental records (state transcript, letter, Paula’s 2014 conviction) were cumulative or not known by prosecutors; no materiality or intentional misconduct; remand only for Brady inquiry	Affirmed: no Brady/Giglio violation (evidence cumulative or not shown to be known by prosecutors); district court properly denied plea withdrawal; remand did not mandate a new sentencing hearing

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Moss, 217 F.3d 426 (6th Cir.) (Speedy Trial Act dismissal standard and factors)
United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582 (6th Cir.) (analysis of prejudice and reprosecution in Speedy Trial Act context)
Bragan v. Poindexter, 249 F.3d 476 (6th Cir.) (elements for vindictive‑prosecution claim)
United States v. LaDeau, 734 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (prosecutorial ‘‘stake’’ when suppression forces government to restart case)
United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527 (6th Cir.) (refiling an indictment does not by itself create prosecutorial stake)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial balancing test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptively prejudicial delay concept)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality—reasonable probability of different result)
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (no constitutional right to plea‑immunity/impeachment information prior to guilty plea)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor may not knowingly present false testimony)