United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287

Background

John Sampson, a former New York State Senator and licensed attorney, was tried and convicted by a jury of obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)) and two counts of making false statements to federal agents (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)); he was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment (concurrent).
Facts at trial: Sampson borrowed $188,500 from Edul Ahmad and did not repay; Ahmad was later indicted for mortgage fraud and cooperated with the government. Sampson sought confidential USAO information about potential witnesses, enlisted a USAO paralegal (Noel) to search nonpublic files, arranged counsel and investigative efforts to monitor co‑defendants, and took from Ahmad a subpoena‑responsive check‑register copy and told Ahmad to lie about it.
FBI agents interviewed Sampson; he denied recollection of the check‑register page and denied asking a Senate staffer to assist with liquor‑store tax matters—statements that formed the § 1001 counts.
The government pursued Count 4 (§ 1503 omnibus obstruction) as an inchoate ‘‘endeavor’’ to obtain nonpublic witness information with the corrupt aim of facilitating witness tampering; other witness‑tampering and related counts were charged but Sampson was acquitted on some.
District court denied multiple pretrial and post‑trial motions; on appeal Sampson raised: (1) that § 1503 cannot reach witness‑related conduct due to Hernandez/Masterpol; (2) faulty jury instruction on § 2(b) ‘‘willfully caused’’ aiding‑and‑abetting; (3) insufficiency of evidence on § 1001; (4) exclusion of FBI agent notes and limits on cross‑examination; (5) unfair prejudice from bribery evidence; and (6) unreasonable sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

Issues

Issue	Government/Appellee Argument	Sampson/Defendant Argument	Held
Whether § 1503(a)’s omnibus clause may criminalize an inchoate endeavor to obtain confidential witness information intended to facilitate witness tampering	§ 1503(a) still prohibits ‘‘endeavors’’ that corruptly aim to obstruct administration of justice, including inchoate efforts to procure nonpublic witness information to facilitate tampering	Hernandez and Masterpol restrict witness‑related prosecutions to § 1512 and bar § 1503 liability for witness‑related conduct; thus Count 4 must be vacated	§ 1503(a) may validly reach inchoate endeavors to facilitate witness tampering; Hernandez/Masterpol limited to their facts and do not bar prosecution here; conviction affirmed
Sufficiency and jury instruction on aiding and abetting (§ 2(b)) mens rea for Count 4	Jury properly instructed that defendant is guilty if he knowingly, willfully and corruptly caused another to obstruct justice; ‘‘willfully caused’’ instruction read as requiring deliberate, purposeful conduct and earlier definitions conveyed ‘‘corruptly’’	The aiding‑and‑abetting instruction failed to require proof that Sampson acted ‘‘corruptly’’ (specific intent to obstruct) when causing Noel’s conduct	Reading the charge as a whole the jury was adequately instructed on requisite mens rea (intent/corrupt purpose); no reversible error
Sufficiency of evidence for § 1001 false‑statement conviction re: check‑register page	Evidence (Ahmad’s testimony that he showed the page, Sampson’s conduct instructing Ahmad to lie and seizing the copy, and Sampson’s statements to agents) permitted a reasonable jury to find the statement false and knowingly made to deceive	The agent’s question was ambiguous and Sampson’s denial was literally true (he had not seen the FBI’s photocopy); insufficient evidence of intent to deceive	Evidence was sufficient; the statement was not literally true in context and jury could infer knowledge and intent to deceive; conviction affirmed
Exclusion of Agent Zacher’s notes and limitation on cross‑examination about the liquor‑store denial; Confrontation Clause challenge	Notes were hearsay offered for truth; trial court allowed cross‑examination of Agent Hosey about interview structure and allowed calling Agent Zacher directly; limiting question was a permissible restriction to prevent an end‑run around rulings	Exclusion of notes and prohibition of question deprived Sampson of evidence and effective cross‑examination in violation of the Confrontation Clause	District court did not abuse discretion nor violate Confrontation Clause; hearsay exclusion and reasonable limits on cross‑examination affirmed
Admission of evidence of alleged bribery/ political favors as unfairly prejudicial	Evidence was highly probative to show motive, intent, and the ‘‘story of the crime’’; Rule 403 balancing and limiting instructions were applied	McDonnell decision narrowed ‘‘official act’’ and undermines relevance; evidence was unduly prejudicial	Admission was proper; district court reasonably balanced probative value against prejudice and gave limiting instructions
Reasonableness of 60‑month sentence; Guidelines enhancements (16‑level, abuse of trust), upward variance, disparity	Sentencing court applied §2J1.2/§2X3.1 tied to underlying fraud (§2B1.1), found defendant knew or should have known about large‑scale fraud; applied §3B1.3 abuse of public trust; provided extensive reasons for upward variance	No factual basis for loss knowledge (1.5M+), §3B1.3 misuse of ‘‘special skill’’ unsupported, variance unjustified, sentence disparate	Sentencing court did not clearly err on facts, permissibly applied enhancements, adequately justified upward variance, and disparity argument fails; sentence affirmed

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1984) (held intimidation/harassment of witnesses should be prosecuted under § 1512 after 1982 amendments)
United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversed § 1503 conviction where § 1512 covered corrupt persuasion of witnesses)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (discussed structure and scope of § 1503(a) omnibus clause)
United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (elements for conviction under § 1503 omnibus clause; ‘‘natural and probable effect’’ standard)
United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (defined ‘‘corruptly’’ mens rea for § 1503 as specific intent to obstruct)
United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting other circuits’ rejection of narrow reading of § 1503 post‑1982)