United States v. Sampson
898 F.3d 270
2d Cir.2018Background
- John Sampson, a New York State Senator and court‑appointed foreclosure referee, allegedly diverted surplus foreclosure proceeds from escrow accounts he controlled for sales in 1998 (Forbell St.) and 2002 (Eighth Ave.).
- Sampson placed the surplus funds in escrow accounts but did not remit them to the Kings County Clerk (KCC) as required by court orders and state law; over time he made withdrawals and transfers for personal use.
- The indictment charged two counts of federal‑program embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), alleging specific acts in 2008 (an $8,000 transfer in Feb. 2008 and an exchange of a KCC check on June 7, 2008).
- Sampson moved pretrial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) to dismiss those counts as time‑barred by the five‑year statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), arguing the embezzlements were "complete" in 1998 and 2002 when he failed to remit the funds.
- The district court granted the motion, finding as a matter of law that the embezzlements were complete when Sampson failed to remit the funds (on day six), and dismissed the two § 666 counts as time‑barred.
- The government appealed; the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding the district court prematurely resolved factual questions about Sampson’s fraudulent intent and reinstated the two counts for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Sampson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the § 666 embezzlement statute of limitations begin to run? | It begins when all elements are met — here when Sampson, by his conduct culminating in 2008 acts, converted funds; factual question for jury. | It began when he first failed to remit surplus funds in 1998/2002, so the 2013 indictment is time‑barred. | Court: Timing depends on when fraudulent intent and conversion occurred; district court erred in deciding intent/timing pretrial. Counts reinstated. |
| May a district court resolve a factbound statute‑of‑limitations defense on a Rule 12(b) motion without a full government proffer? | No; resolving intent‑dependent timing requires trial unless the government makes a full proffer of all evidence. | Yes; the record (indictment and undisputed facts) shows completion in 1998/2002 so dismissal is proper. | Court: Pretrial dismissal was improper absent a complete government proffer; Rule 12(b) cannot be used as a summary‑judgment device in criminal cases. |
| Does the indictment sufficiently allege § 666 jurisdictional elements (agent status and agency receipt of federal funds)? | Indictment alleges Sampson acted as an agent of the Supreme Court (a state agency) and that the Supreme Court received >$10,000 federal funds annually. | Challenges: (1) he was agent of Kings County Supreme Court, not State Supreme Court; (2) agency terminated; (3) agency ended when prior embezzlements occurred. | Court: Indictment is adequate on its face; factual disputes about agency duration or termination are for the jury; alternative defenses fail pretrial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (clarifying use of traditional definitions when statutes omit terms)
- United States v. Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d 1283 (2d Cir.) (crime is complete when every element occurs)
- United States v. Williams, 733 F.3d 448 (2d Cir.) (statute of limitations begins when offense is complete)
- United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772 (2d Cir.) (pretrial sufficiency inquiries require a full government proffer)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (intent as a question of fact not ordinarily resolved by judge)
- Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (statute‑of‑limitations defenses may be raised pretrial where clear on the face of the charging instrument)
- Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (indictment validity is assessed on its face; courts avoid testing government evidence pretrial)