United States v. Sampson
1:01-cr-10384
D. Mass.Sep 8, 2015Background
- Gary Sampson, previously sentenced to death by Judge Mark L. Wolf in 2004, had that sentence vacated for juror misconduct; the First Circuit affirmed and remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding.
- In July 2014 Judge Wolf moderated a public panel (film screening + discussion) about a Florida prisoner (DeFriest) that included Dr. James Gilligan, whose 2010 affidavit had been filed as an exhibit in Sampson's voluminous §2255/amended petition.
- Judge Wolf did not know (and asserts he did not know at the time) Gilligan had earlier submitted that affidavit; Wolf disclaimed any endorsement of the film or panelists at the event and limited remarks were recorded.
- In June 2015 Sampson moved to retain Dr. Gilligan as a potential expert for the retrial; Judge Wolf promptly disclosed his prior association with Gilligan and the parties and government investigated.
- The government moved for Judge Wolf's recusal under 28 U.S.C. §455(a) (appearance of partiality); it conceded no actual bias under §455(b)(1) and declined to waive §455(a) under §455(e). Sampson opposed recusal.
- Judge Wolf denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable, fully informed member of the public would not question his impartiality given the totality of facts and precedent balancing public confidence with preventing judge-shopping.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Sampson / Judge Wolf) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §455(a) requires recusal for Judge Wolf’s participation in the DeFriest program | A reasonable person, fully informed, could question impartiality because Wolf organized, publicized, and moderated a one-sided panel that included an expert later associated with Sampson | Wolf and Sampson: the program was educational, the film/panel did not mention Sampson, Wolf expressly disclaimed endorsement, and Gilligan was not then a retained trial witness | Denied — §455(a) not triggered: no reasonable, fully informed person would doubt impartiality |
| Whether Gilligan’s prior 2010 affidavit (filed in Sampson’s §2255 filing) changes the analysis | Government: the added fact of prior involvement increases appearance of partiality given Wolf’s association with Gilligan | Wolf: even if presumed known, Gilligan was not retained in 2014; his affidavit was one exhibit among many and not relied upon by Wolf | Denied — prior affidavit did not create reasonable appearance of partiality |
| Whether Gilligan’s later status as a potential trial witness mandates recusal | Government: Wolf’s acquaintance and public praise of Gilligan risks perceived bias, and panel comments overlap with subjects Gilligan may testify on | Wolf: acquaintance is not friendship requiring recusal; panel remarks were general and not a pre-screening of trial testimony; Wolf repeatedly disclaimed agreement with panelists | Denied — prospective witness status did not meet high threshold for §455(a) recusal |
| Whether heightened reliability in capital cases demands a different outcome | Government implies higher stakes warrant stricter appearance standards | Wolf: §455(a) standard applies; parties agree Wolf is actually impartial; vacating an unbiased judge’s prior decisions is not warranted absent actual bias | Denied — heightened capital interest does not lower §455(a)’s high threshold or require recusal here |
Key Cases Cited
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (§455(a) requires a high threshold: disqualification only for attitudes a fair‑minded person could not set aside)
- In re United States, 158 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (recusal inquiry measured by reasonable, informed public standard; high threshold to prevent judge-shopping)
- In re Allied‑Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1989) (district court afforded discretion; disclosure and context matter; caution against Caesar’s‑wife standard)
- In re Bulger, 710 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2013) (court balanced appearance concerns with preventing manipulation of recusal rules; distinguished actual bias from appearance‑based recusal)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (failure to disclose a judge’s financial interest required vacatur; distinguishes §455(b) and §455(a) considerations)
- In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992) (recusal required where judge attended a plaintiffs‑sponsored conference that effectively pre‑screened expert testimony and disclosure was lacking)
- In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001) (judge’s attendance at an imbalanced seminar did not require recusal when seminar did not address legal issues material to the case)
- Pitera v. United States, 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (context and judge’s broader pattern of public speaking relevant; public education efforts alone do not compel recusal)