4 F.4th 97
D.C. Cir.2021Background
- Samira Jabr drove from California to Washington, D.C., believing she was the victim of a conspiracy and sought to speak with President Trump in person.
- Following GPS directions, Jabr scaled two fences and ran up stairs to the locked door of the United States Treasury Building (adjacent to the White House); she was arrested by Secret Service officers.
- The government charged Jabr by information under 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) for entering or remaining in a “restricted building or grounds,” alleging the area as the “White House Complex and United States Department of Treasury Building and Grounds.”
- At a bench trial the district court concluded the Treasury Building was outside the statute’s definition of the “White House or its grounds,” acquitted Jabr of the completed offense, but found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempting to commit the § 1752(a)(1) offense.
- Jabr was sentenced to time served and 12 months supervised release; the district court ordered $480 restitution for an unrelated wallet theft, which the government later conceded was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the information sufficiently alleged a federal offense / whether district court had jurisdiction | Information charged violation of § 1752(a)(1); that suffices to invoke federal jurisdiction | Information’s geographic description exceeded statute (included Treasury), so it did not necessarily allege a federal offense; thus no jurisdiction | Jurisdiction proper: charging § 1752(a)(1) is enough; any defect in geographic description was harmless |
| Whether convicting on an attempt theory constructively amended the information | Government argued attempt was permissible and within the charged offense | Jabr argued constructive amendment/variance because she was charged with the completed offense only | No impermissible amendment: Rule 7(e) allows amendment of informations before verdict; conviction for attempt is allowed under Rule 31(c)(2); no prejudice shown |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Jabr acted “without lawful authority” under § 1752(a)(1) | Evidence (fences, padlock, ducking past police, admissions) supports lack of authority | Jabr argued insufficient proof she lacked lawful authority | Evidence sufficient: a rational factfinder could conclude beyond reasonable doubt she acted without lawful authority |
| Validity of restitution order for unrelated wallet theft | Government sought restitution for wallet theft as victim loss | Jabr argued restitution unrelated to offense of conviction | Restitution vacated: restitution must compensate losses caused by conduct underlying the offense of conviction; wallet theft unrelated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Fahnbulleh, 752 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (charging a Title 18 offense establishes district court jurisdiction)
- United States v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (charging instrument must allege all elements to avoid being defective)
- United States v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (defects in an information do not deprive the court of jurisdiction)
- Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (distinguishes amendment of indictment from variance)
- Mechanik v. United States, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (harmless-error doctrine can render certain charging errors harmless)
- Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (constitutional right to notice of criminal charges)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (standard for harmless constitutional error)
- Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (restitution limited to losses caused by conduct underlying conviction)