United States v. Salley
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13258
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Salley was convicted in Maine of possession of a firearm after a misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction and was charged in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
- The government sought to prove Salley’s possession of the gun by tracing ownership through witnesses, phone records, and an Uncle Henry’s advertisement linking Salley to the firearm.
- Skyla Salley testified about Salley obtaining and keeping the gun; other witnesses corroborated acquisition and presence of the gun in the home.
- Defense theory suggested Skyla planted the gun or conspired with others to frame Salley; defense introduced Rebecca Hughes to support this framing theory.
- During closing, the prosecutor made two statements allegedly affecting Salley’s rights: one denying planting the gun and one addressing knowledge of the gun’s presence.
- Salley moved for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s closing statements; the district court denied the motion as harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the first closing statement was plain error | Salley contends the remark misled the jury by endorsing Skyla’s framing theory. | Salley argues the remark was improper and prejudicial. | No plain error; comment within permissible rebuke of defense theory. |
| Whether the second closing statement was plain error (burden shifting / comment on silence) | Salley asserts burden-shifting and implied reference to his failure to testify. | Salley contends it was an improper comment on his silence. | Not reversible plain error; any prejudice was not sufficient given context and evidence. |
| Whether, even if misconduct occurred, Salley is entitled to a new trial | Misconduct violated his rights and required new trial. | Harmless error analysis should govern; cumulative evidence overwhelming. | District court did not abuse discretion; no substantial prejudice. |
| What standard governs review of prosecutorial-misconduct claims on plain-error review | Standard should support reversal for plain error. | Apply standard requiring error, obviousness, and substantial prejudice. | Plain-error standard applied; failure to show substantial prejudice defeats reversal. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2009) (comment on defense theory within proper scope)
- United States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (set limits on burden-shifting remarks)
- United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967 (1st Cir. 1995) (remarks rebutting defense theory treated cautiously)
- United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1992) (avoid drawing damaging inferences from lengthy exhortations)
- United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2007) (factors for evaluating prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct)
- Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (jury instructions and evaluation of evidence in misconduct review)
- United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2007) (plain-error review framework)
- United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (analysis of plain-error prejudice and substantial rights)
- United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (de novo review of legal questions; abuse-of-discretion for prejudice)
- United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (burden-shifting remarks and defendant responsibility to present evidence)
- United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761 (1st Cir. 1996) (prejudice assessment in closing arguments)
- United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1985) (avoid improper inference from defense tactics)
- United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741 (1st Cir. 1985) (limits on prosecutorial commentary during closing)
- Taylor v. Morales-Vallellanes, not applicable (not applicable) (placeholder to maintain citations structure)