United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248

In 2010 Salazar pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 922(g)(1)); statutory maximum ten years. In 2011 the district court sentenced him to 115 months’ imprisonment plus three years supervised release.
Salazar completed the prison term and began supervised release in May 2019; a probation petition alleged supervised-release violations (battery and associating with a felon).
At revocation the district court revoked supervised release and imposed ten months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release; Salazar argued any reimprisonment could not make his aggregate incarceration exceed the 120‑month statutory maximum.
Salazar appealed, arguing the ten‑month post‑revocation term was illegal because combined with the prior 115 months it exceeded the statutory maximum; the government defended the sentence under § 3583(e)(3).
The panel addressed jurisdiction (mootness): although Salazar had completed the ten‑month term he had not begun the one‑year supervised‑release term, so the appeal was not moot because a favorable ruling could reduce or eliminate that supervised‑release term.
On the merits the Tenth Circuit held Robinson controls and affirmed: § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment within its own limits even if the aggregate time served exceeds the statutory maximum for the underlying substantive offense.

Issue	Salazar's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Mootness / Jurisdiction	Appeal not moot because he still had unserved supervised release that could be reduced on remand	Agreed: unexpired supervised release preserves a live controversy	Not moot — appeal proceeds because supervised release could be reduced/eliminated
Legality of post‑revocation imprisonment exceeding statutory max	Post‑revocation imprisonment may not be imposed if aggregate (prior + new) exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime	§ 3583(e)(3) sets the maximum for reimprisonment; it is independent and may exceed the original statute’s maximum when aggregated	Rejected Salazar’s aggregation argument; Robinson controls; sentence affirmed
Effect of 1994 amendment to § 3583(e)(3)	Amendment changed the reference point and undermines Robinson’s reasoning	Robinson already considered the amended language; amendment does not justify overruling Robinson	Amendment does not warrant overruling Robinson
Impact of Johnson / Apprendi / Haymond on Robinson	These precedents require jury findings for facts that increase punishment and thus undermine Robinson’s judge‑found reimprisonment/aggregation	Cordova and circuit precedent hold Apprendi/Alleyne do not apply to standard § 3583(e) revocation proceedings; Haymond is limited to § 3583(k) and does not disturb Robinson	Apprendi/Haymond do not undermine Robinson; Robinson remains controlling law

United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 1995) (held § 3583 authorizes reimprisonment after revocation even if aggregate imprisonment exceeds the substantive‑offense statutory maximum)
United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1991) (same principle recognizing supervised release as independent part of sentence)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (post‑revocation penalties are attributable to the original conviction; addressed ex post facto and supervisory release authority)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality invalidated § 3583(k); concurrence limited application of Apprendi/Alleyne in supervised‑release context)
United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2006) (held Apprendi does not apply to § 3583(e) revocation proceedings)