United States v. Saffle, 151 F. Supp. 3d 31

Five protesters (Bronstein, Kresling, Mrabet, Rodriguez, Saffle) interrupted a Supreme Court oral-argument session on April 1, 2015 with brief spoken/sung statements; each was removed and arrested.
U.S. Attorney filed a two-count information: Count One (18 U.S.C. § 1507) for demonstration to influence proceedings; Count Two (18 U.S.C. § 6134) charged making a “harangue or oration” or uttering “loud, threatening, or abusive language” in the Supreme Court building/grounds.
Government later superseded the information to charge only that defendants made a “harangue or oration or utter[ed] loud language in the Supreme Court Building,” omitting “threatening/abusive” and “grounds.”
Defendants moved to dismiss Count Two on vagueness grounds (Due Process): arguing “loud,” “harangue,” and “oration” are unconstitutionally vague and vest undue discretion in law enforcement.
The Court evaluated vagueness doctrine and considered whether statutory language could be given a limiting construction before striking terms down.
Ruling: the Court upheld a narrowed reading of the Uttering Clause — permitting prosecution only for utterances that disturb or tend to disturb the normal operations of the Supreme Court — but held the terms “harangue” and “oration” unconstitutionally vague on their face.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 6134’s ban on “loud” language is unconstitutionally vague	Govt.: term can be limited to speech that disturbs Court operations	Defendants: “loud” has no objective standard; invites arbitrary enforcement	Court: Not facially void — "loud" saved by limiting construction to utterances that disturb or tend to disturb normal operations of the Supreme Court
Whether § 6134’s prohibition on “harangue” is unconstitutionally vague	Govt.: ordinary dictionary meanings are sufficient (forceful/angry speech)	Defendants: term is archaic, multi-meaning, subjective, and gives no clear core	Court: "Harangue" is unconstitutionally vague in all applications; dismisses as facially vague
Whether § 6134’s prohibition on “oration” is unconstitutionally vague	Govt.: ordinary meaning is a "formal speech" and fits the statute	Defendants: “oration”’s formality is subjective and indeterminate	Court: "Oration" is unconstitutionally vague in all applications; dismisses as facially vague
Whether a limiting construction is appropriate before invalidation	Govt.: statute can be read narrowly to avoid vagueness	Defendants: narrowings proposed are insufficient or speculative	Court: Adopted limiting construction for "loud" (disturbing normal operations); declined to craft limiting meanings for "harangue" and "oration"

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (vagueness doctrine; need for objective core)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (facial vagueness principles)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (as-applied vs facial vagueness; heightened First Amendment scrutiny)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (upholding ordinance limited to disturbances of school activities)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (consider limiting constructions before striking)
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (struck down vague ordinance criminalizing "annoying" behavior)
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (facial vs as-applied vagueness analysis)
United States v. Agront, 773 F.3d 192 (9th Cir.) (upholding noise/regulation when limited to disturbance of normal facility operations)
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir.) (subjectivity and individual sensitivities in vagueness analysis)
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir.) (contextual evaluation of noise regulations)