United States v. Ruby
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2011
| 10th Cir. | 2013Background
- Ruby on supervised release after prison for felon in possession of a gun; violated condition by committing third-degree assault in Colorado.
- Colorado state court convicted Ruby of third-degree assault but acquitted other charges; sentencing reflected a more violent version of events than undisputed facts.
- Federal probation officer filed a Petition for Arrest and Supervised Release Violation Report describing a violent sequence leading to the revocation.
- District court credited the Violation Report over Ruby’s version, imposing an 18-month sentence within the guidelines range and 12 months of supervised release.
- Ruby objected to reliance on the Violation Report but did not request an evidentiary hearing or contest specific evidence; he stipulated to the violation and prior violence history.
- Appeal challenges whether hearsay evidence at sentencing was admissible and whether Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) applies to the sentencing phase of a revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) applicability | Ruby argues Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) required an interest-of-justice finding for hearsay at sentencing. | Court held Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the sentencing phase of revocation proceedings. | Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to sentencing. |
| admissibility of hearsay at sentencing | Ruby contends hearsay is unreliable and should not influence sentencing. | District court acted within relaxations of evidence rules; hearsay with minimal reliability can be used if corroborated. | Hearsay may be considered at sentencing with minimal indicia of reliability and corroboration. |
| plain-error review of sentencing procedure | Any error in relying on hearsay constitutes procedural error affecting the sentence. | No reversible error; Ruby did not show plain error affecting substantial rights. | No plain error; challenge to hearsay evidence fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2011) (standard for reviewing revocation-sentence procedures)
- Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540 (10th Cir. 2010) (due process and Rule 32 framework in revocation proceedings)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parole revocation due process rights)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (due process in revocation is similar to probation; focus on reliable information)
- United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 1995) (sentencing can rely on information beyond trial admissibility)
- United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832 (10th Cir. 2012) (minimal indicia of reliability required for hearsay at sentencing)
- United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2008) (corroboration supports reliability of hearsay at sentencing)
- United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 1995) (unreliability when sole, unsworn hearsay without corroboration)
- United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2009) (balancing approach to hearsay evidence in revocation sentencing rejected in some circuits)
- Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (U.S. 1949) (hearsay permissible at sentencing under traditional due process)
- Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2006) (distinguishes sentencing from guilt adjudication rules)
