United States v. Ruberman Ardon Chinchilla
987 F.3d 1303
| 11th Cir. | 2021Background
- Federal grand jury indicted Ruberman Ardon Chinchilla on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) for presenting a forged Form I-220B (Order of Supervision) to obtain a Florida driver’s license.
- Orders of supervision are issued under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13, 241.4, 241.5 and permit an unlawfully present alien to be “permitted to be at large” pending removal; they do not change immigration status but may authorize employment.
- Florida DHSMV accepts an order of supervision as proof of legal presence for driver’s licenses; some federal benefit regulations (SSI, certain healthcare/tax-credit rules) also recognize orders of supervision as evidence of lawful presence or residence “under color of law.”
- Chinchilla moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, arguing § 1546(a)’s phrase “authorized stay” means lawful immigration status and that no statute or regulation expressly lists an order of supervision as evidence of authorized stay.
- The district court dismissed the indictment; the government appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding an order of supervision can qualify under § 1546(a)’s catch‑all "other document…as evidence of authorized stay."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Chinchilla) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an Order of Supervision is a “document prescribed by statute or regulation…as evidence of authorized stay” under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) | An order of supervision is prescribed by regulation, permits an alien to remain "at large" pending removal, and thus is evidence of authorized stay | An order of supervision does not confer lawful status and therefore cannot be evidence of "authorized stay" | Held: Yes. An order of supervision falls within § 1546(a)’s plain meaning as a document prescribed by regulation that shows formal permission to remain conditionally in the U.S. |
| Whether “authorized stay” in § 1546(a) must be read as the immigration-law technical concept of lawful status/unlawful presence | Statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning, not imported technical INA definitions | “Authorized stay” should be equated to immigration-law concepts (e.g., stay authorized by the Attorney General/unlawful presence rules) | Held: No. Court refused to import INA technical definitions; interpreted "authorized stay" by its ordinary meaning and statutory context. |
| Whether § 1546(a)’s “prescribed by statute or regulation” requires an express listing of an order of supervision in statute/regulation using § 1546(a)’s exact language | The ordinary meaning of “prescribed” is broader; an order issued under 8 U.S.C./8 C.F.R. and recognized in other federal regulations suffices | District court: because no statute or regulation verbatim lists orders of supervision as evidence of authorized stay, they do not qualify | Held: No. The court rejected the narrow requirement of a verbatim, express listing; Form I-220B and related regulations demonstrate the document is prescribed as evidence of permission to stay. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (recognized limits of earlier § 1546 scope under prior wording)
- United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2003) (elements and interpretation guidance for § 1546 prosecutions)
- United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting § 1546’s "other document" clause by ordinary meaning)
- Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2007) (advance parole form can be evidence of authorized stay)
- United States v. Wei Lin, 738 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishable Ninth Circuit decision holding a driver’s license did not qualify under § 1546)
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (principle that identical words can mean different things in different statutory contexts)