United States v. Rosario, 7 F.4th 65

Carlos Rosario pled guilty in the S.D.N.Y. to sexual exploitation of a minor and related offenses and was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment plus lifetime supervised release.
The district court imposed a $5,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a), which applies to “non-indigent” persons convicted of listed offenses.
On initial appeal the Second Circuit remanded under United States v. Jacobson for clarification because the record did not explain why the court found Rosario non-indigent.
At resentencing the district court expressly relied on Rosario’s present finances, extensive prior work history, vocational skills, training while incarcerated, and likely post-release earnings, and reimposed the $5,000 JVTA assessment.
Rosario appealed, arguing (1) the court erred as a matter of law by considering future earning potential in the § 3014(a) indigency inquiry, and (2) in any event the finding that he was non-indigent was clearly erroneous.
The Second Circuit affirmed: it held courts may consider future earning potential when determining indigency under § 3014(a) and found no clear error in the district court’s factual conclusion that Rosario was non-indigent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether future earning potential may be considered in determining indigency under 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)	Rosario: “Indigent” means lack of present resources only; future earnings are irrelevant.	Gov’t: Ordinary meaning of “indigent” includes means/ability to earn; statute’s 20‑year collection window and Sentencing Guideline practice support considering future earnings.	Court: A district court may consider both present resources and future earning potential when determining indigency under § 3014(a).
Whether the district court clearly erred in finding Rosario non‑indigent	Rosario: His sex‑offender status, debts, negative net worth, and limited present resources make him indigent.	Gov’t: Court reasonably weighed debts against education, prior work history, vocational skills, and probable post‑release ability to pay over 20 years.	Court: No clear error; the factual finding that Rosario was non‑indigent is affirmed.
Standard of review for Rosario’s statutory challenge	Rosario: statutory error (not preserved below) but merits argued.	Gov’t: challenge not preserved; review is for plain error.	Court: Reviewed statutory interpretation for plain error but resolved the issue on statutory grounds; concurrence would have applied plain‑error and construed “indigent” as present‑tense.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error standard for unpreserved claims)
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (statutory interpretation starts with ordinary meaning)
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (text must be read in context)
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (same words can mean different things in different contexts)
United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.) (procedure when record lacks explanation for financial findings)
United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271 (2d Cir.) (district courts may consider present and prospective resources in indigency/fine contexts)
United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137 (5th Cir.) (interpreting “indigent” to permit forward‑looking assessment)
United States v. Shepherd, 922 F.3d 753 (6th Cir.) (holding indigency may include assessment of means to exit poverty)
United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2020) (district court may consider present and future resources when assessing indigency)