739 F.3d 1027
7th Cir.2014Background
- Roosevelt L. Spencer pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. §922(g) for possessing a firearm after prior felony convictions.
- The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. §924(e)) and found Spencer had three qualifying predicates, imposing the 15-year mandatory minimum.
- Two prior convictions undisputedly qualified; the dispute concerned a Wisconsin methamphetamine conviction under Wis. Stat. §961.41(1)(e)(1) (Class F felony).
- Wisconsin law prescribes a 12½-year statutory maximum for a Class F felony (§939.50(3)(f)), but for offenses committed in 2000+ the sentence is bifurcated: up to 7½ years initial confinement (§973.01(2)(b)(6m)) plus a term of extended supervision (up to the balance of the statutory cap).
- The government argued the §924(e) “maximum term of imprisonment” includes the practical maximum custodial exposure (including possible confinement during extended supervision), yielding a 12½-year maximum; Spencer argued the phrase means the judge’s maximum imprison- ment at sentencing (7½ years).
- The district court adopted the government’s view; the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the statutory maximum means the judge’s highest possible confinement at sentencing (7½ years) and remanded for resentencing without §924(e) enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Wisconsin Class F felony’s “maximum term of imprisonment” for §924(e) includes extended supervision and administrative extensions (practical custodial exposure). | The statutory 12½-year cap (including extended supervision and DOC-administered revocations) should count as the maximum for §924(e). | The term means the maximum a judge can impose at sentencing (the 7½-year initial confinement), excluding post‑sentencing administrative extensions. | Held for Spencer: “maximum term” refers to the judge’s maximum sentence at sentencing (7½ years), so the meth conviction is not a §924(e) serious drug offense. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (Supreme Court 2008) (defines “maximum term” to include recidivist enhancements available at sentencing)
- McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (Supreme Court 2011) (maximum term assessed as of the date of sentencing; later statutory reductions do not alter prior maximum)
- Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (Supreme Court 2010) (good‑time credit scheme does not change a sentence’s statutory maximum)
- United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court 1979) (historical parole practices distinguished from statutory maximum sentence)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (Supreme Court 2013) (predicate analysis for federal recidivist statutes relies on the statutory terms of the conviction)
- Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (Supreme Court 2010) (invoking rule of lenity where statutory ambiguity exists)
- Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (Supreme Court 2003) (applies rule of lenity principles)