United States v. Ronell Moses, Jr., 142 F.4th 126

Officer Hess stopped Ronell Moses for suspected marijuana use and dark window tints while Moses was driving.
As Moses turned into his residential driveway (around 40 feet in, past the porch stairs), Hess initiated a traffic stop, approached, and searched Moses’s car without a warrant, finding a firearm.
Moses was a felon on parole, making possession of a firearm illegal under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
Moses moved to suppress the gun, arguing the search was invalid because his car was within his home’s curtilage and the officer entered it without a warrant.
The District Court denied suppression, finding the search area was not curtilage, and denied Moses’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds.
Moses appealed, preserving both the Fourth Amendment (curtilage) and Second Amendment issues for review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the driveway where Moses parked within the home's curtilage (Fourth Amendment)?	The search was inside the curtilage—past porch stairs, enclosed, used for family life, thus warrant required.	The search occurred in an exposed, open part of the driveway, not curtilage; driveway open to public view.	Not curtilage; no warrant needed.
Is review of curtilage determination de novo after Ornelas?	Should be de novo as a mixed question of law and fact affecting constitutional rights.	Opposed revisiting standard/argued for clear error review, or that Moses forfeited argument.	Review is de novo.
Is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as facially or as applied?	Law violates Second Amendment rights for felons, or at least for Moses.	Law is constitutional; precedent permits disarming felons on parole.	Statute constitutional.
Do any exceptions (implied consent, hot pursuit, good faith) justify the warrantless search?	None apply; Moses did not consent, revoke any supposed consent, no hot pursuit occurred.	Officer's actions justified by implied consent, hot pursuit, or good faith reliance on prevailing law.	No exception; but majority found no Fourth Amendment violation.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (curtilage extends limited constitutional protection outside the home itself)
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (seminal test for curtilage analysis—sets out four factors)
Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586 (2018) (curtilage includes areas adjacent to the home, such as driveways or nooks abutting a house)
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (curtilage is part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes—area immediately surrounding the home)
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (Fourth Amendment mixed questions reviewed de novo)
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement)
United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266 (3d Cir. 2024) (facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails if law constitutional as-applied)