854 F.3d 341
6th Cir.2017Background
- Ronald Myers, a long-time motor-home thief, stole at least eight RVs using forged Virginia titles and “clone” titles from other states, then sold them to dealers after transporting them across state lines. He and co-conspirator Walter Nunley stole three RVs in the Western District of Michigan.
- Indictment: one count of § 371 conspiracy to steal/transport/sell RVs; three substantive counts under § 2312 for transporting the three Michigan-stolen RVs; one money-laundering conspiracy count under § 1956(h); two substantive concealment money-laundering counts under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (alleging sales and cash retrievals outside Michigan).
- Myers sought to represent himself; the district court denied Faretta motions after observing disruptive behavior and recorded calls showing intent to delay/cost the government; interlocutory appeals/mandamus petitions were dismissed.
- Myers moved to dismiss money-laundering counts for improper venue; district court denied venue and the jury convicted on all counts. Sentencing Guideline range was 360–1,140 months; court imposed 360 months.
- On appeal Myers challenged venue for money-laundering counts, jury venue instructions, multiplicity of counts, denial of self-representation, and several sentencing enhancements and loss calculations.
Issues
| Issue | Myers' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue for substantive concealment money-laundering (counts 6–7) | Venue improper in Western District of Michigan because the laundering transactions occurred outside the district; the stolen RVs are not “proceeds” for §1956 venue purposes | Venue proper under 18 U.S.C. §1956(i)(1)(B) because Myers committed the underlying thefts in Michigan, possessed the stolen RVs there (the "proceeds"), and participated in transferring them out before laundering | Affirmed: statutory venue covers districts where underlying offense could be prosecuted and defendant participated in transferring proceeds; constitutionally permissible because laundering was committed in part where possession/transfer occurred |
| Venue for money-laundering conspiracy (§1956(h)) | Same venue objection; Myers argued conspiracy venue improper in Michigan | Venue proper because §1956(i)(2) allows venue where substantive venue lies and because overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in Michigan | Affirmed: venue proper under both prongs; conspiracy is continuing and venue in any district of overt acts is constitutional |
| Multiplicity of counts (conspiracy §371 vs. substantive §2312; §371 vs. §1956(h)) | Counts duplicate and punish the same conduct | §371 conspiracy and §2312 substantive offenses are distinct; §1956(h) creates a distinct money-laundering conspiracy offense | Affirmed: not multiplicitous under Blockburger and controlling precedent (conspiracy vs. substantive; distinct elements for money-laundering conspiracy) |
| Denial of self-representation (Faretta) | Myers argued district court wrongly denied his Faretta request | Court relied on Myers’ interruptions, stated intent to delay/cost government, and inability to proceed orderly; right to self-representation requires voluntary and intelligent waiver | Affirmed: district court permissibly concluded Myers had not intelligently elected self-representation and denial was justified to preserve trial integrity |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) (§1956(h) money-laundering conspiracy is a distinct offense; venue for conspiracy may lie where overt acts occurred)
- Rodriguez-Moreno v. United States, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (identify conduct elements and their location to determine constitutional venue; crime committed in part supports venue)
- United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) (money‑laundering venue improper where all laundering conduct occurred outside the forum; distinguishes laundering transaction conduct from antecedent illegal activity)
- Lombardo v. United States, 241 U.S. 73 (1916) (where a crime consists of distinct parts with different localities, whole may be tried where any part occurred)
- Palliser v. United States, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) (continuing offenses may be tried where later parts occur; mailing/continuing-offense reasoning)
- Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) (transportation offenses treated as continuing and triable across route)
- Nichols v. United States, 416 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (upheld laundering venue in district where defendants were charged with causing transport of proceeds out of that district and with related conspiratorial acts)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspiracy and substantive offenses are distinct; conspiratorial liability separate)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (test for multiplicity/double jeopardy: each offense must require proof of an element the other does not)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has right to self-representation but must intelligently and voluntarily waive counsel; court may deny where integrity/efficiency threatened)