United States v. Romelus Martin
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10469
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Martin pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon; district court applied a 24 base level due to two prior violent-crime convictions (2007 conspiracy to commit robbery; 2009 Maryland fourth-degree burglary) and sentenced him to 77 months.
- Guidelines define a 24 base level under § 2K2.1(a)(2) if defendant has at least two prior felonies that are crimes of violence; otherwise base level is 20 (one prior crime of violence).
- The district court treated both 2007 and 2009 Maryland convictions as crimes of violence, yielding a 24-level base offense and a 77-month sentence after adjustments for acceptance of responsibility.
- Martin contests only the 2009 conviction’s treatment as a crime of violence; if not a crime of violence, his base level would be 20 and advisory range 51-63 months.
- This appeal vacates and remands for resentencing because the 2009 conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause.
- The court ultimately vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing consistent with these conclusions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fourth-degree burglary qualifies as a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause | Martin argues §6-205(a) is not similar in kind to enumerated offenses; risk analysis insufficient | Government argues degree-of-risk analysis is sufficient; Begay's similar-in-kind may apply | No; 2009 conviction not a crime of violence under residual clause under Begay and related tests |
| Effect of Begay and Sykes on residual-clause analysis post-Sykes | Begay’s similar-in-kind requirement should apply | Sykes limits Begay to certain strict-liability contexts; degree of risk suffices | Begay may apply in some cases, but degree-of-risk analysis sustains outcome; Begay not required here |
| Whether Maryland fourth-degree burglary is a crime of violence because it can be committed negligently | Conviction may be negligent, undermining similarity in kind | Knowledge requirement in Md. §6-205(a) makes conduct purposeful | Conviction not classified as crime of violence under residual clause; vacate and remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (guideline-based burglary definition; relevant to generic burglary)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) ( Begay’s similarity-in-kind test; limits residual-clause scope)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (U.S. 2011) (limits Begay; risk-focused analysis can suffice under residual clause)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (U.S. 2007) (risk-based comparison to closest enumerated offense; foundational residual-clause test)
- United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2013) (post-Sykes residual-clause analysis in Fourth Circuit; risk-focused approach)
- United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (post-Sykes treatment of Begay’s test in Fourth Circuit)
- United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2012) (application of Begay to understand purposeful conduct in certain crimes of violence)
- United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2012) (post-Sykes residual-clause analysis; degree of risk focus)
- Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 554 A.2d 1238 (Md. 1989) (Maryland knowledge requirement for breaking and entering; culpability standard)