11 F.4th 529
6th Cir.2021Background
- Rolando Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and money laundering and was initially sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) based on two prior controlled-substance convictions.
- This court remanded for resentencing after deciding in United States v. Havis that attempt crimes (including conspiracies) do not qualify as controlled-substance offenses for § 4B1.1.
- On remand the district court concluded Johnson no longer qualified as a career offender, lowered his criminal-history category (from VI to III), and resentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment.
- Johnson appealed again, arguing the remand required a de novo resentencing rather than a limited reconsideration of career-offender status.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed whether its prior remand was limited or general, applying its precedents on remand scope and limiting language.
- The court held the remand was limited to reconsideration in light of Havis and affirmed the district court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of remand (general vs. limited) | Johnson: remand should have been general, permitting de novo resentencing | Government: remand was limited to reconsidering career-offender status after Havis | Remand was limited to reconsidering career-offender status; district court acted within scope |
| Proper resentencing procedure on remand | Johnson: district court should have reopened entire sentencing (new evidence/issues) | Government: district court properly confined proceedings to Havis-related issue | District court correctly limited resentencing to the effect of Havis on career-offender status |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (held attempt crimes, including conspiracies, are not § 4B1.1 controlled-substance offenses)
- United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020) (describes presumption that remands are general and how to determine scope)
- United States v. McFalls, 675 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012) (general remand permits redo of entire sentencing)
- United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1999) (limited remand explicitly outlines issues for district court)
- United States v. Patterson, 878 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2017) (look to limiting language and broader context to determine remand scope)
- United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2003) (remand-scope analysis principles)
- United States v. Woodside, 895 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2018) (limiting language may appear anywhere in opinion)