United States v. Roger Charles, II
932 F.3d 153
4th Cir.2019Background
- Roger Charles II was convicted in 2005 of (1) possession with intent to distribute >50 g crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841) and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); both sentences were 360 months and were ordered concurrent.
- The firearm sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); the drug sentence was enhanced by a career-offender designation under the Guidelines.
- After Johnson v. United States narrowed ACCA’s residual clause, Charles filed a § 2255 motion disputing the ACCA enhancement (and arguing the same predicates could not support a career-offender designation).
- The district court, relying on Beckles to reject the Guidelines-based attack and invoking the concurrent sentence doctrine, declined to reach Charles’s Johnson-based challenge to the ACCA enhancement because a valid concurrent 360‑month drug sentence remained; the court found collateral harms posited by Charles (stacked supervised-release revocations) too speculative.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s use of the concurrent sentence doctrine, holding that speculative or unrealistic collateral-consequence theories do not preclude applying the doctrine.
- After briefing, the First Step Act was enacted; because the Act might entitle Charles to a reduction of his drug sentence (which would affect whether the concurrent‑sentence rationale still bars review), the Fourth Circuit remanded for the district court to consider First Step Act eligibility before resolving the § 2255 challenge to the firearm sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Charles' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly applied the concurrent sentence doctrine to decline review of Charles’s ACCA-enhanced firearm sentence | The concurrent-sentence rule is inapplicable because leaving the ACCA sentence unreviewed could cause collateral consequences (stacked supervised-release revocations) | Because a valid concurrent 360‑month drug sentence remains, any error in the firearm sentence is harmless; speculative collateral consequences do not defeat the doctrine | The court affirmed: speculative or unrealistic future harms do not prevent application of the concurrent sentence doctrine; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether the hypothetical risk of consecutive supervised-release revocation terms is a realistic collateral consequence | Charles: If firearm sentence remains a Class A felony, revocation exposures could be stacked to add up to 10 years (vs. 7 if firearm reduced), so there is a real collateral injury | Gov: The stacking scenario is highly speculative and remote; it depends on future misconduct and multiple unlikely judicial choices | Held: The risk was too speculative and within Charles’s control; not a realistic potential adverse collateral consequence |
| Whether intervening First Step Act changes the analysis and requires remand | Charles: The First Step Act could reduce his drug sentence; leaving the firearm sentence unreviewed would nullify any First Step Act relief, so review is needed | Gov: Argues Charles is not eligible under the Act, so no change to concurrent-sentence analysis | Held: Because the district court did not consider the First Step Act (enacted after its ruling), remand is required for the district court to address First Step Act eligibility and, if reduction is granted, then consider the § 2255 claim to the firearm sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson made retroactive on collateral review)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Sentencing Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge)
- Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (concurrent-sentence doctrine cannot avoid review of separate convictions where statutory assessments make sentences not truly concurrent)
- Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (noting collateral consequences of multiple convictions limit the concurrent-sentence doctrine)
- Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (formulation and application of the concurrent sentence doctrine in this circuit)
- Eason v. United States, 912 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2019) (speculative future misconduct cannot defeat concurrent-sentence doctrine)
- United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (harmless-error review conserves judicial resources)
- Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (discussing doctrinal limits and implications when sentence reductions change need for review)