United States v. Rodriguez-Rosado
854 F.3d 122
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- In May 2010 Wilfredo Rodríguez-Rosado pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 15–50 kg of cocaine; the district court sentenced him to 180 months in October 2010 based on a base offense level (BOL) of 34.
- In 2014 the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782 (retroactive) reducing certain drug BOLs by two levels; under that amendment Rodríguez’s BOL would be 32.
- The District of Puerto Rico issued Administrative Directive AD 14-426 (Nov. 6, 2014) establishing an automatic magistrate screening process for § 3582(c)(2) motions and a procedure for meeting/stipulation and referral to the district judge if eligibility remained.
- Rodríguez filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion in November 2014; the district judge denied it sua sponte before the magistrate could apply AD 14-426. The magistrate later recommended referral, but the district court again denied the motion in a text order.
- Rodríguez timely signaled his intent to appeal by pro se letters (January 12 & 19, 2015); the First Circuit found those filings sufficient to satisfy Rule 3 liberal construction for pro se litigants.
- The First Circuit vacated the district court’s denials and remanded so the district court could apply its AD 14-426 process and reconsider Rodríguez’s motion in light of the established administrative procedure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal | Gov't: Rodríguez’s filings were untimely; only a Feb 18 form was cited | Rodríguez: December 8 form and January letters show intent and were timely under prison-mailbox rule | Court: January 12 pro se letter was timely and evidenced intent to appeal; appeal not dismissed |
| District court’s failure to apply AD 14-426 | Rodríguez: Court erred by denying motion before magistrate screening and the AD process | Government: District court has discretion; no automatic entitlement to relief | Court: Remanded — vacated denials and directed district court to apply AD 14-426 process before ruling |
| Whether remand is appropriate despite no clear sentencing error | Rodríguez: procedural irregularity merits remand for consistent treatment | Government: substantive discretion remains with sentencing court; remand unnecessary | Court: Remand prudent to let judge apply recently adopted administrative procedure and ensure consistent handling |
| Whether court should decide merits now | Government: decision within district court’s discretion; appellate court should not substitute judgment | Rodríguez: requested remand for full AD process | Court: Expressed no view on merits; left substantive decision to district court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ahrendt, 560 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (ordered remand to let sentencing judge consider non-retroactive guideline change)
- United States v. Godin, 522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (remand appropriate to allow judge to consider Commission’s revised approach)
- United States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d 1105 (1st Cir. 1993) (denial of § 3582(c)(2) motion is an appealable final order)
- United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 2015) (granting § 3582(c)(2) relief is committed to sentencing court’s discretion)
- Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317 (1st Cir. 2003) (pro se filings construed liberally to evidence intent to appeal)
- DeLong v. Dickhaut, 715 F.3d 382 (1st Cir. 2013) (liberal construction of pro se filings in appellate timeliness context)