United States v. Rodriguez
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20732
1st Cir.2011Background
- Rodriguez was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on prior state offenses after a search of his Lynn, Massachusetts apartment uncovered multiple firearms, ammunition, drugs, and cash.
- Rodriguez waived indictment and pled guilty to one-count information; district court sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment plus 5 years' supervised release under ACCA.
- The ACCA predicates at issue include four prior convictions: a 1995 New Jersey arson; a 1998 Massachusetts drug-distribution offense; a 1998 Massachusetts larceny from the person; and a 2003 Massachusetts assault and battery.
- Rodriguez challenged the use of larceny from the person (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 25) and assault and battery as ACCA predicates, arguing they do not qualify.
- The district court held larceny from the person could be a violent felony under the residual clause; the court did not address the assault and battery predicate.
- On appeal, the First Circuit examined whether Massachusetts larceny from the person qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA, and whether Begay’s framework limits consideration of the crime’s risk and mens rea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Massachusetts larceny from the person qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA | Rodriguez argues it lacks the force element required by the ACCA’s residual clause. | Goverment contends the offense presents a serious risk of physical injury and thus is a violent felony under the residual clause. | Yes; larceny from the person qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause. |
| Whether Begay limits the use of risk-based analysis for this offense | Begay limits predicate crimes by purpose and violence; larceny from the person lacks these features. | Begay is distinguishable or non-controlling; the residual clause focuses on risk, not mens rea alone. | Begay does not foreclose using the residual-clause risk analysis for this offense. |
| Whether the Massachusetts larceny from the person and related authorities mirror or differ from De Jesus | Rodriguez relies on De Jesus’s interpretation that larceny from the person is a crime of violence. | The panel must apply current circuit and Supreme Court guidance, which may diverge from De Jesus after Begay/Sykes. | De Jesus governs generally, but Sykes/Begay limit its reach; the panel adopts the residual-clause interpretation consistent with De Jesus in this context. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 2011) (link between 'violent felony' and residual clause analysis)
- United States v. De Jesus, 984 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1993) (larceny from the person deemed a crime of violence under residual clause)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (limits the use of DUI-like generic risk to violent-crime characterization)
- Sykes v. United States, U.S. (U.S. 2011) (clarifies Begay and conceptualizes risk vs. purposeful conduct)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 379 Mass. 177, 396 N.E.2d 974 (Mass. 1979) (mens rea considerations in distinguishing offenses)
- Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 283 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1972) (distinguishing robbery's force element within Massachusetts law)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (U.S. 2007) (risk-based analysis guidance for violent felonies under ACCA)
- Commonwealth v. Davis, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 385 N.E.2d 278 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (Massachusetts case cited on larceny/robbery distinctions)
- Commonwealth v. Zangari, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 677 N.E.2d 702 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (post-De Jesus discussion on related state-law authority)