United States v. Rodney Foster
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1845
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Foster and wife owned a Lee’s Summit, Missouri home targeted for sale but struggled to find a buyer.
- Ragland, Foster’s conduit, ran TERM, mortgage-appraisal/brokerage with both legal and illegal services including straw-buyer use.
- A fraudulent loan was applied for in Christopher Taylor’s name using a fake driver’s license with Edenfield’s photo.
- Conspirators artificially inflated the property value to repay the mortgage and split excess funds.
- Foster acted as mortgage broker; the scheme continued until Foster and Ragland’s sister (Foster’s wife) divorced in 2009.
- FDIC investigation followed after the wife reported concerns; Christopher Taylor later named as a defendant in a civil suit for unpaid HOA dues arising from the Lee’s Summit property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conspirators knew the identity belonged to a real person | Foster argues conspirators did not know the identity was real | Government contends it proved knowledge of a real person’s identity | Yes; sufficient proof of knowledge of a real person’s identity |
| Whether the means of identification used could identify a specific individual | Foster argues the used identification was not sufficiently specific | Government shows documents provided identifying details that pinpoint Christopher Taylor | Yes; means of identification was sufficiently specific to identify a person |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550 (11th Cir. 2011) (repeated testing of victim’s ID supports real-person knowledge)
- United States v. Castellanos-Loya, 503 F. App’x 240 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished per curiam; ID of a forged check can identify a specific person)
- United States v. Alexander, 725 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (forensic-like use of personal data to identify a person in 1028(d)(7))
- United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (definition of means of identification and sufficiency principles)
- United States v. Calhoun, 721 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2013) (conspiracy to commit a substantive offense requires same degree of intent as the substantive offense)
- Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (requires knowledge that the means of identification belonged to a real person)