United States v. Rodney Flucas
22 F.4th 1149
| 9th Cir. | 2022Background
- Rodney Flucas was convicted at a jury trial for transporting minors and an adult across state lines with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(a), 2421(a)) based on long‑running sexual abuse of his daughters and other household minors.
- Victim testimony showed abuse over years in multiple states and that Flucas moved members of his household from Oregon to California; Flucas admitted some sexual contact but testified he moved for a higher‑paying teaching job.
- At trial the government proposed, and the district court gave, an instruction stating guilt could follow if criminal sexual activity was a “significant, dominant, or motivating purpose” of the transportation (i.e., not merely incidental).
- Flucas objected and argued the jury should have been instructed that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant purpose of the transportation was to engage in criminal sexual activity.
- The jury convicted and the district court sentenced Flucas to life; Flucas appealed arguing the instruction lowered the mens rea requirement and conflicted with Mortensen and related precedent.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the instruction was consistent with Ninth Circuit and sister‑circuit precedent that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose suffices for the intent element of the transportation/travel statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Flucas) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a jury may be instructed that a criminal sexual purpose need only be a “motivating, significant, or dominant” purpose of interstate transportation to satisfy the mens rea for §§ 2421(a)/2423(a) | Instruction correct and consistent with Ninth Circuit and other circuits; multiple motives are common and precedent allows a motivating/significant/dominant standard | Instruction lowered burden; the government must prove the dominant purpose was to engage in criminal sexual activity (not merely a motivating purpose) | Affirmed: a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose suffices; instruction not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the 2018 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (adding “with a motivating purpose”) requires changing the mens rea for §§ 2421(a)/2423(a) | Amendment to § 2423(b) is nonretroactive and does not bear on §§ 2421(a)/2423(a); Congress did not amend those provisions | Amendment shows “motivating” is a lower standard and underscores that courts should require dominant purpose for §§ 2421(a)/2423(a) | Held: amendment inapplicable to these charges and does not undermine the court’s instruction |
| Whether, given the instruction and evidence, reversal is required (harmless‑error / sufficiency) | Evidence and jury instruction supported conviction; any claimed error is not reversible | Instructional error (if any) was prejudicial because evidence that sexual intent was the dominant motive to move was thin | Held: court found no reversible error and affirmed conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944) (Supreme Court language describing Mann Act intent as a “dominant motive” that influenced later jurisprudence)
- United States v. Kinslow, 860 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding immoral activity may be one of the dominant purposes for interstate transportation)
- United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving an instruction that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose sufficed to infer intent)
- United States v. Lindsay, 931 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019) (reaffirming that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose instruction was not plainly erroneous)
- United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding instruction that illegal sexual activity need be a significant or motivating purpose, not sole purpose)
- United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining dominant/efficient purpose standard and rejecting a but‑for limitation)
- United States v. Cryar, 232 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding evidence supported jury conclusion that a motivating or dominant purpose existed)
- United States v. Vang, 128 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 1997) (surveying Mann Act history and treating “dominant” as synonymous with “compelling” or “motivating”)
- United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972) (tax‑context discussion of dominant vs. significant motivation relied on by dissent to argue for a stricter standard)